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INTRODUCTION

State entities, including public universities, often own significant
portfolios of intellectual

property.2

The abundance

of state

ownership in patents, in particular, can be traced to the enactment of
the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.1 The Bayh-Dole Act allows non-profit
institutions and their researchers to obtain intellectual property rights
in results produced from federally-funded research.4 As a result of
the Bayh-Dole Act, the number of patents filed by universities

increased from fewer than 250 per year to 1,500 per year by 1995. 5
This increase in ownership of intellectual property rights provided an6
incentive for universities to exploit technology transfer avenues

2. As of 2001, public universities owned more than 2,700 registered trademarks and
nearly 12,000 patents. Id. at 57 (statement of R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President,
United States Chamber of Commerce). Likewise, since 1978, four-year state colleges and
universities have obtained copyright registrations on more than 32,000 monographs. State
Sovereign Immunity and Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts and IntellectualProperty of the Comm. on the Judiciary,106th Cong.
15 (2000) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.J89/1:106/99) [hereinafter Hearing Before House Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights, Copyright Office of the United States Library of Congress).
3. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (2000)). The purpose of the Act is "to promote the utilization of
inventions arising from federally-supported research or development .... ." See 35
U.S.C. § 200 (2000) (permitting state and federal entities to obtain patent protection for
their inventions). Likewise, the Copyright Act grants copyright protection in works
produced by state governments. See Copyright Remedy Clarification Act § 105, 17 U.S.C.
§ 105 (2000) (precluding the availability of copyright protection for any work of the
federal government, but not prohibiting such protection for works of state governments).
Similarly, section 45 of the Lanham Act allows states to obtain trademark protection. See
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining a person who
may obtain trademark protection to include "any State").
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), (c)(7)(B).
5. See Association of University Technology Managers ("AUTM"), Licensing
Survey FY 1991-FY 1995, Executive Summary, at http://www.autm.net/pubs/survey/
autmsum2.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) [hereinafter AUTM, FY 1991] (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
6. See AUTM, About AUTM, at http://www.autm.net/index-n4.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2003) (describing an organization comprised of technology transfer offices,
representing more than three hundred universities, hospitals, and other non-profit
institutions) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See generally Kenneth
Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed
Biomedical

Technologies,

52

FOOD

DRUG

L.J.

453

(1997)

(discussing

the

commercialization of intellectual property through university technology transfer offices).
Technology transfer encompasses the sharing of knowledge and resources among nonprofit research organizations, such as federal laboratories and universities, and private
firms, with the general purpose of developing the technology into new commercial
products. See National Technology Transfer Center, at http://www.nttc.edu/products/
guide/SECA01.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
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through which they could license those rights to private firms for
commercial development.7 Accordingly, universities entered into
more than 4,300 licenses in the year 2000 alone.8 By 2000, nearly
21,000 active licenses existed between universities and private firms.9
These licenses can generate more than one billion dollars in annual
income to universities through licensing fees, royalties, and equity
interests. 10 This creative environment also gave birth to start-up or
spin-off companies which allow institutions and their researchers to
exploit the commercial value of their inventions directly."
The promise of the Bayh-Dole Act has been fulfilled in the
twenty-plus years since its enactment.1 2 This success, however, has
not been met with universal acceptance. 3 In particular, some critics
have raised concerns regarding the potential inequities between the
respective abilities of state entities, such as public universities, and
7. See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 96 (1999) (noting that monopoly rights in
inventions arising from federally-funded research were seen as a necessary incentive for
private firms to undertake the investment required to develop the inventions into
commercial products).
FY 2000, Executive Summary, at
8. See AUTM, A UTM Licensing Survey:
http://www.autm.netsurveys/2OOO/summarynoe.pdf, at 1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter AUTM, FY 2000] (summarizing a survey of university technology transfer
managers) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In 1999, for example, the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill "had 47 licenses generating income, was
issued 41 new patents, and applied for 74 more." Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 1, at
17 (statement of Leslie Winner, General Counsel and Vice President, University of North
Carolina).
9. See AUTM, FY 2000, supra note 8, at 1.
10. See id.
11. See Peter J. Harrington, Faculty Conflicts of Interest in an Age of Academic
Entrepreneurialism:An Analysis of the Problem, the Law and Selected University Policies,
27 J.C. & U.L. 775, 780-81 (2001) (describing the proliferation of faculty start-up
companies). More than 450 new companies based on academic research were formed in
the United States during fiscal year 2000. See AUTM, FY 2000, supra note 8, at 1. For
example, North Carolina State University formed eight start-up companies in 1999.
Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 1, at 44 (statement of Leslie Winner, General Counsel
and Vice President, University of North Carolina).
12. See, e.g., KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATric 2
(2000) (noting that " 'intellectual property [has been] transformed from a sleepy area of
law and business to one of the driving engines of a high-technology economy' " (quoting
Sabra Chartrand, Patents,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1999, at C2)).
13. See Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab:
Law, Values and Rules of Engagementfor Industry-University R&D Partnerships,39 AM.
Bus. L.J. 187, 189 (2002) (noting that critics of industry-university collaboration argue that
the commercial objectives of private firms are inconsistent with the academic values of
university research); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82
VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666-67 (1996) (arguing that the policies behind the Bayh-Dole Act run
counter to the public good).
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private intellectual property owners to obtain and enforce federal
intellectual property rights.

14

These concerns have intensified as state

entities have become increasingly involved in commerce. 5 Some
critics argue that when states participate in the intellectual property
system, they are not performing a government function, but instead
are participating in a market and should be subject to the rules of that
market. 6
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions and a related
decision from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have
magnified such concerns. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 7 College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,18 and
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press9 each held that states, including public
institutions such as universities, are entitled to obtain intellectual
property protection under federal law and to enforce those rights
against private parties while remaining immune from liability for
infringing the intellectual property rights of others.20 Indeed, states
have brought several suits to enforce their patent and licensing
rights.2 ' The potential reach of the Florida Prepaid,College Savings,
14. See Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing on
S. 1611 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,107th Cong. 6 (2002) (Sup. Docs. No. Y
4.J 89/2:S.HRG.107-866) [hereinafter Hearingon S. 16111 (statement of James E. Rogan,
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent
and Trademark Office).
15. See id. (arguing that states must also accept responsibility-potential liability for
damages arising from infringement-that comes with protecting and enforcing their
intellectual property rights).
16. See Hearing Before House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, supra
note 2, at 31 (statement of Mark A. Lemley, Professor of Law, University of California at
Berkeley). But see Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 685 (1999) ("[Sluit by an individual against an unconsenting State is the very evil
at which the Eleventh Amendment is directed-and it exists whether or not the State is
acting for profit, in a traditionally 'private' enterprise, and as a 'market participant.' ").
17. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
18. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
19. 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
20. See infra notes 127-85 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions in Florida
Prepaid,College Savings, and Chavez).
21. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d
998, 1008-09 (D. Minn. 1999) (finding that a federal court must hear the State's claim of
relief seeking enforcement of a licensing agreement of a patented compound); Univ. of
Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 974 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (D. Colo. 1997), affd,
342 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (alleging copyright, patent infringement, fraud, and unjust
enrichment claims against license holder); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp.
948, 951 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (seeking declaration of co-inventorship and conversion of
patent); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., 804 F. Supp. 614, 616 (D.N.J. 1992) (alleging
infringement of university-owned patent); see also Jennifer Polse, Comment, Holding the

1072

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

and Chavez decisions, coupled with isolated incidents of alleged state

infringement, 22 has fueled recent attempts by Congress to restrict the
scope of state sovereign immunity under federal intellectual property
law.23
On October 29, 1999, only a few months after the Florida
Prepaid and College Savings decisions, Senator Patrick Leahy
introduced the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of
1999 ("IPPRA of 1999").24 The IPPRA of 1999 conditioned a state's

participation in the federal intellectual property system on an
agreement to waive its sovereign immunity 25 and, in part, would have
denied a state the right to receive a patent unless it waived immunity
from suit in federal court.26 This bill did not reach a vote in the
Senate.2 7 Other attempts to promulgate similar legislation have met
Sovereign's Universities Accountable for Patent Infringement after Florida Prepaid and
College Savings Bank, 89 CAL. L. REV. 507, 508-09 (2001) (discussing the effect of current
Eleventh Amendment doctrine on the ability of state universities to dictate "when, where,
and how to enforce their federal patent rights and the patent rights of others").
22. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of The Honorable
Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Chairman,
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property) (citing as an example a
Maryland state hospital that allegedly pirated software programs and asserted sovereign
immunity to shield itself from liability); Hearing on S.1611, supra note 14, at 29-31
(statement of Kenneth Schraad, Western Regional Director, National Information
Consortium, Lawrence, Kansas) (testifying about a dispute regarding copyright ownership
of software developed for the State of Georgia); see also Hearingon H.R. 2344, supra note
1, at 11 (statement of The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress
from the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property) (citing as an example the California Department of Health
Services alleged infringement of a patent for assessing placental dysfunction). Other
examples of alleged state infringement have surfaced in the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Chavez, 204 F.3d at 603 (addressing copyright infringement and violations of the Lanham
Act in view of Florida Prepaid and College Savings); Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm'n on the
Arts, 199 F.3d 279, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting the Florida Prepaidframework in the
copyright context). In addition, a study conducted by the Software and Information
Industry Association in the six years preceding the Supreme Court's Florida Prepaid
decision identified at least seventy-seven matters involving infringements by state entities,
with more than one-half of those matters involving institutions of higher learning. See
Hearingon H.R. 2344, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Mark Bohannon, General Counsel
and Scnior Vice President for Public Policy, on behalf of the Software and Information
Industry Association).
23. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
24. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S.1835, 106th Cong.
(1999), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
25. Id. § 111.
26. Id. § 131(c).
27. See generally Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of
Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix" Florida Prepaid (and How Not to), 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1037 (2001) (providing an analysis and, comprehensive overview of the IPPRA of
1999 and suggesting alternative approaches to addressing state sovereign immunity); Steve
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the same fate.28
Nevertheless, on June 5, 2003, Senator Leahy introduced the
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003 ("IPPRA of
2003").29 The purpose of the IPPRA of 2003 is "[t]o restore Federal
'30 If
remedies for infringements of intellectual property by States.
enacted, this bill would allow private intellectual property owners to
sue states for infringement damages, thereby effectively abrogating
state immunity against such suits.3'
The main distinction between the 2003 Act and the 1999 Act is
that the 1999 Act contained provisions for an "opt in procedure,"
whereby a state must waive sovereign immunity from suit in federal

Malin, The Protection of Intellectual-PropertyRights in a Federalist Era, 6 COMPUTER L.
REV. & TECH. J. 137, 177-81 (2002) (describing in detail the provisions contained in the
IPPRA of 1999); Gilbert L. Carey, Comment, The Resurgence of States' Rights Creates
New Risk to Intellectual Property, 11 ALB. L.J. SCi. & TECH. 123, 145-51 (2000) (analyzing
in detail the provisions of the IPPRA of 1999 in light of the Court's decisions in Florida
Prepaidand Seminole Tribe).
28. See Robert C. Wilmoth, Toward a Congruent and Proportional Patent Law:
Redressing State Patent Infringement After Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 55
SMU L. REV. 519, 522 (2002) (noting that the committee had not produced any of the
intellectual property protection restoration bills by the end of 2001). Progress toward
bringing such legislation to a vote has been delayed by unfruitful negotiations "between IP
owners, who are pressuring Congress for the reform, and state government
representatives, who object to it." News, Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendment Stiffens IP
Protection/Immunity Waiver Trade-Off, 64 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
32, 32-33 (2002) [hereinafter Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendment Stiffens IP Protection]
(describing the potential effect of the IPPRA of 2002).
29. See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003 ("IPPRA of 2003"),
S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Senator Leahy introduced three identical bills with various co-sponsors. See id.;
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2002 ("IPPRA of 2002"), S. 2031,
107th Cong. (2002), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001 ("IPPRA of 2001"), S. 1611,
107th Cong. (2001), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Several Congressmen also introduced counterparts to these bills in the House. See
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 2344, 108th Cong. (2003),
http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Intellectual Property
Protection Restoration Act of 2001, H.R. 3204, 107th Cong. (2001), http://thomas.loc.gov
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also News, Leahy and Brownback
Reintroduce Bill Allowing IP Suits Against States, 63 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 455, 455 (2002) [hereinafter Leahy and Brownback] (describing how H.R. 3204 is
identical to S. 2031 and S. 1611).
30. S. 1191, pmbl. Due to the relatively recent introduction of the IPPRA of 2003,
little commentary and debate directly address it. For that reason, this Comment will refer
to commentary and debate on its predecessors, the IPPRA of 2001 and the IPPRA of
2002. The bills are substantially identical and discussion of the 2001 Act and the 2002 Act
therefore applies equally to the 2003 Act. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31. See Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendment Stiffens IP Protection,supra note 28, at 32-33
(describing the potential effect of the 2002 Act).
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court from any action arising under federa, intellectual property law
to be eligible to acquire federal intellectual property rights.3 2 These
provisions are similar, in concept, to draft amendments to the
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2002 ("IPPRA of
2002"), introduced by Senator Leahy and Senator Orrin Hatch
("draft Leahy/Hatch amendments").33
Predictably, a broad spectrum of organizations made up of
intellectual property owners, including organizations representing the
publishing, recording, and entertainment industries, support the
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act.34
Equally
predictable, public universities, university technology transfer
managers, and state officers generally oppose such legislation.35
Notwithstanding the concerns voiced by advocates on both sides of
this issue, the fate of the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration
Act will depend on whether it comports with the Supreme Court's
current Eleventh Amendment doctrine.
The Court has struck down previous attempts by Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under federal intellectual property
laws. In Florida Prepaid and College Savings, the Court severely
curtailed the rights of private intellectual property owners to sue the
states for alleged patent infringement and violations of section 43(a)

32. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 106th Cong.
§ 111(b) (1999), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This
bill further provided that if a state "opts in," but later breaches the waiver, it will not be
allowed to participate in the federal intellectual property system. Id. § 113. Under these
provisions, a state that breaches the "opt in" agreement would face three consequences:
(1) any pending applications shall be regarded as abandoned, id. § 113(a); (2) damages
shall not be awarded to a state to enforce infringement of state-owned federal intellectual
property for the preceding five years, id. § 113(b)(1); and (3) the state will not be able to
opt back into the federal intellectual property system for one year, id. § 113(c)(1). See
Malin,supra note 27, at 179 (highlighting the "opt in" provisions of S. 1835); Carey, supra
note 27, at 146-47 (same); John D. Livingstone, Comment, Uniformity of Patent Law
Following Florida Prepaid: Should the Eleventh Amendment Put Patent Owners Back in
the Middle Again?, 50 EMORY L.J. 323, 356-57 (2001) (same).
33. See Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendment Stiffens IP Protection, supra note 28, at 32
(requiring states to waive their Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as a condition
for ownership of intellectual property).
34. The IPPRA of 2002 garnered support from the American Bar Association, the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the Business Software Alliance, the
Intellectual Property Owners Association, the International Trademark Association, the
Motion Picture Association of America, the Professional Photographers of America
Association, and the United States Chamber of Commerce. See 148 CONG. REC. S2079
(daily ed. Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
35. See Hearingon H.R. 2344, supra note 1, at 13-19 (statement of Leslie J. Winner,
Vice President and General Counsel, University of North Carolina) (summarizing the
view of public universities toward the !PPRA of 2003).

2004]

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

1075

of the Lanham Act.3 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
similarly restricted the rights of private intellectual property owners
37
to sue the states for alleged copyright infringement in Chavez.
Even though predecessor bills to the IPPRA of 2003 were not
brought to a vote, it is likely that some version of the Act, or other
legislation with similar provisions, will eventually be brought to a vote
and may ultimately become law.38 It is therefore imperative to
examine the provisions of the Act and the proposed amendments to
predecessor Acts to determine if they comply with the current
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and other constitutional
provisions, as well as the general policies of the federal intellectual
property system. This Comment will address the constitutionality of
the IPPRA of 2003, its predecessor bills, and the draft Leahy/Hatch
amendments in view of FloridaPrepaid,College Savings, Chavez, and
the line of Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases addressing state
sovereign immunity. 39 This Comment also will examine whether such
legislation and the draft Leahyi/llatch amendments are consistent
with the public policy goals set forth in the Bayh-Dole Act and other
federal research funding initiatives. To this end, this Comment will
evaluate the impact of the IPPRA of 2003 and the draft Leahy/Hatch
amendments on public university technology transfer programs.
This Comment argues that the IPPRA of 2003 and the draft
Leahy/Hatch amendments do not comport with the Court's current
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and also conflict with the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Furthermore, this Comment
argues that the provisions in the Act and the draft Leahy/Hatch
amendments run counter to the policy goals of existing legislation,
such as the Bayh-Dole Act, which encourages non-profit entities,
such as public universities, to obtain intellectual property rights for
their innovative creations and discoveries, and to transfer such
technological
achievements
to
the
private
sector
for
36. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 685, 691 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999).
37. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601,607-08 (5th Cir. 2000).
38. Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1040 (postulating that "[g]iven the widespread
support among beneficiaries of federal intellectual property rights for some sort of
legislative action, it appears likely that ... some version of the Leahy bill [S. 1835] ... will

ultimately become law").
39. The aim of this Comment is not to critique the
jurisprudence or to delve into the Federalism implications
this Comment analyzes recent attempts by Congress
immunity in intellectual property infringement actions
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.

Court's Eleventh Amendment
of its recent decisions. Instead,
to abrogate states' sovereign
in view of the Court's recent
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commercialization. Finally, this Comment suggests a less draconian
alternative, based on the analytical framework developed in Florida
Prepaidand Chavez, to limit potential infringing acts by state entities.
This Comment proposes legislation that would (1) limit causes of
action by a private party against a state to those acts that constitute
intentional infringement; (2) limit such suits to those against states
that exhibit a pattern of infringing acts; and (3) allow suits only
against those states with inadequate remedies under state law. This
approach would provide protection for private intellectual property
owners against egregious infringement by state actors while allowing
state entities, such as public universities, to continue to participate in
the federal intellectual property system without waiving sovereign
immunity.
This Comment will proceed in five parts. Part I provides a brief
description of the IPPRA of 2003 and the draft Leahy/Hatch
amendments. 0 Part II presents an overview of the line of cases
establishing the current Eleventh Amendment doctrine, including
those cases that directly impact issues related to state sovereign
immunity and intellectual property rights.4'
Part III addresses
whether the IPPRA of 2003 and the draft Leahy/Hatch amendments
comport with the current Eleventh Amendment doctrine.4 2 Part IV
examines whether the purposes of the IPPRA of 2003 and the draft
Leahy/Hatch amendments are consistent with the public policy goals
of the federal intellectual property system and federal research
initiatives, such as the Bayh-Dole Act.4 3 Alternative approaches to
legislation that protects intellectual property rights from state
infringement are explored in Part V."
I.

DESCRIPTION OF THE IPPRA OF 2003 AND THE DRAFT
LEAHY/HATCH AMENDMENTS

The IPPRA of 2003 attempts to circumvent the Florida Prepaid
and College Savings decisions by conditioning a state's ability to
recover damages in intellectual property suits on its waiver of
immunity from private suits against it. 45 Under this proposed
legislation, states that refuse to waive immunity would lose the right
40. See infra Part I.
41. See infra Part II.
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. See infra Part V.
45. See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong.
§ 3 (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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to recover monetary damages in infringement actions, but would
retain other intellectual property protections.4 6 An amended version
of the predecessor legislation to the IPPRA of 2003 would have
explicitly required states to waive their Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity as a condition for ownership of intellectual
property. 47 The draft Leahy/Hatch amendments to the IPPRA of
2002 would have added new subsections to federal patent, copyright,
trademark, and plant patent laws to condition a state's ability to
obtain protection under these statutes on the state's waiver of
sovereign immunity. 48 The draft revision of the IPPRA of 2002
containing the draft Leahy/Hatch amendments was circulated but not
introduced in the Senate.49
A.

Purposesof the IPPRA of 2003

Senator Leahy articulated two reasons for responding to Florida
Prepaid and College Savings when he introduced the IPPRA of
2002.10 First, Senator Leahy contended that these two decisions
opened a "huge loophole" in the federal intellectual property system,
where states receive legal protection under this system but are not
46. See Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendment Stiffens IP Protection,supra note 28, at 32-33.
States, however, would retain the right to pursue injunctive relief against private
infringers. Id.
47. Id. Proponents of the IPPRA of 2003, however, have proposed amendments to
the bill as introduced that would preclude non-waiving states from obtaining damages and
injunctions when they bring intellectual property infringement suits. Hearing on H.R.
2344, supra note 1, at 26, 36 (statement of Paul Bender, Professor of Law, Arizona State
University College of Law and Counsel to Meyer & Klipper, PLLC) (suggesting that such
provisions would strengthen the bill and thereby increase the incentives for states to waive
their sovereign immunity).
48. Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendment Stiffens IP Protection,supra note 28, at 32.
49. See id. (noting that "committee action on the draft amendment[s] have been
postponed at least twice"). A search of the bill summary and status did not reveal any
action taken on the IPPRA of 2002 since the bill was introduced and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary. See generally Thomas Legislative Information on the
Internet, at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (providing summaries and
statutes of bills introduced in the Senate and House) (on file with North Carolina Law
Review). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the IPPRA of 2001 in
February 2002. News, Panel Considers Bill to Restore Right to Sue States for IP
Infringements, 63 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 368, 368 (2002). Markups
of the IPPRA were postponed as negotiations between intellectual property owners and
state government representatives were being held. Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendment
Stiffens IP Protection,supra note 28, at 33. The pertinent parts of the IPPRA of 2002 were
reintroduced as the IPPRA of 2003 on June 5, 2003. See generally S. 1191 (introducing the
IPPRA of 2003). A hearing on H.R. 2344, the House version of the IPPRA of 2003, was
held on June 17, 2003. See generally Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 1 (transcribing the
testimony presented at the hearing).
50. See 148 CONG. REC. S2079 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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required to adhere to its laws.51 Citing fairness and a belief in the free
market system, Senator Leahy argued that "[s]tates will enjoy an
enormous advantage over their private sector competitors" under the
current system.52 Second, Senator Leahy raised concerns over the
respective roles of Congress and the Court.53 Noting that the current
Supreme Court has overturned federal legislation with an
unprecedented frequency during the past decade, Senator Leahy
criticized these Supreme Court decisions for often relying "on notions
of state sovereign immunity that have little if anything to do with the
5' 4
text of the Constitution.
The express purposes of the IPPRA of 2003 are to:
(1) help eliminate the unfair commercial advantage that States
and their instrumentalities now hold in the Federal intellectual
property system because of their ability to obtain protection
under the United States patent, copyright, and trademark laws
while remaining exempt from liability for infringing the rights
of others;
(2) promote technological innovation and artistic creation in
furtherance of the policies underlying Federal laws and
international treaties relating to intellectual property;
(3) reaffirm the availability of prospective relief against State
officials who are violating or who threaten to violate Federal
intellectual property laws; and
(4) abrogate State sovereign immunity in cases where States or
their instrumentalities, officers, or employees violate the
United States Constitution by infringing Federal intellectual
property. 5
The draft Leahy/Hatch amendments aimed to revise the first
purpose by striking the term "unfair," by striking the words
''remaining exempt" and replacing them with "retaining immunity,"
and by striking the words "the rights of others" and replacing them
with "intellectual property rights."56 The draft amendments would
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Senator Specter's previous criticism of the Florida Prepaid and
College Savings decisions).
53. Id.
54. Id. Senator Leahy refers to the recent Supreme Court decisions as examples of
"judicial activism." Id. Ever since the Florida Prepaid and College Savings decisions,
Senator Leahy consistently has attempted to limit state sovereign immunity with respect to
federal intellectual property rights. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
55. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong. § 2
(2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
56. Text, Draft Revision of Bill (S. 2031) on State IP Immunity, 64 PAT. TRADEMARK
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also replace the fourth purpose in its entirety with the following
provision:
"(4) provide compensation for harm resulting from
infringements of Federal intellectual property by States or their
instrumentalities, officers, or employees in violation of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution."57
Although these proposed changes to the purposes would not
alter the IPPRA substantively, they could influence how the Act
would be construed by a court. For example, striking the explicit
term "abrogate" from the fourth purpose could result in a finding that
the Act lacks the requisite intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. On the other hand, addition of the language directed
toward violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would
make arguments based on these constitutional provisions available to
aggrieved plaintiffs.
B.

Equalizationof Intellectual PropertyRemedies by Conditional
Waiver

Section 3 of the IPPRA of 2003 provides the core of the
proposed legislation. 8 Under this section, a state would not be
entitled to damages for infringement of its intellectual property unless
it waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages suits
brought against it by private intellectual property owners.5 9 For
example, this section of the bill would amend section 287 of the
Patent Act to provide that no remedies shall be awarded for
infringement of a patent if a state, or state instrumentality, is, or was
at any time, the legal or beneficial owner of the patent, unless the
state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court for any infringement of a patent.60 The bill would make
similar, remedy-limiting amendments to section 504 of the Copyright
Act and section 45 of the Lanham Act.61 These provisions are
& COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 39, 39 (2002) [hereinafter Draft Revision ofS. 2031].

57. Id. Senators Leahy (D-Vt) and Hatch (R-Ut) apparently drafted these
amendments in response to pressure from private intellectual property owners. See Draft
Leahy/Hatch Amendment Stiffens IP Protection,supra note 28, at 33.

58. S. 1191, § 3.
59. Leahy and Brownback, supra note 29, at 455.
60. S.1191, § 3(a) (creating a new section (d)(1) under 35 U.S.C. § 287). This section
also provides that any such waiver must be made in accordance with the constitution and
laws of the state and applies even if the state is no longer the owner of the intellectual
property. Id. Exceptions to the limitations on remedies provided in this section arise if
such limitations would materially and adversely affect a contract-based expectation that
existed prior to January 1, 2004, or if the party seeking remedies was a bona fide purchaser
for value of the patent and did not know that a state was once the owner of the patent. Id.
61.

Id. § 3(b)-(c).
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prospective and would not be applied retroactively-that is, at the
time the bill was introduced, the provisions of the IPPRA of 2003
would have applied only to those patents issued, works created, or
marks registered or used in commerce on or after January 1, 2004.62
C.

Clarificationof Remedies Available for Infringement by State
Officers and Employees

Section 4 of the IPPRA of 2003 clarifies which remedies are
available when state officers or employees violate federal intellectual
property laws. 63 This section provides that, in suits against an officer
or employee of a state, remedies under the federal intellectual
property statutes "shall be available against the officer or employee in
the same manner and to the same extent as such remedies are
available in an action against a private individual under like
circumstances."' The bill expands the remedies available to private
parties in an action against state officers or employees who violate
provisions of federal patent, copyright, or trademark laws to include,
inter alia, monetary damages, injunctive relief, and the destruction of
infringing articles.65 This prospective relief against state officials
essentially codifies, and expands upon, the relief available under the
doctrine of Ex parte Young,66 which allows an individual to sue a state
official for injunctive relief, but not for monetary damages.6 7
D. Liability of Statesfor ConstitutionalViolations Involving
IntellectualProperty
Section 5 of the IPPRA of 2003 provides a private right to
compensation when state infringement of intellectual property rises
to the level of a constitutional violation.6" This section of the bill
holds states liable for acts that violate intellectual property rights in a
manner that deprives any person of property in violation of due

62. See id. § 3(a)-(c).
63. Id. § 4.
64. Id. This provision of the bill, in essence, provides an owner of a patent, copyright,
or trademark the injunctive remedies that would be available against a private individual.
See Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 25 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive
Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association, Arlington, Virginia)
(discussing the remedies available under predecessor legislation to the IPPRA of 2003).
65. S. 1191, § 4.
66. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
67. See id. at 159-60 (holding that an individual may sue a state official for prospective
relief even if the state itself is immune from suit); infra notes 264-68 (discussing types of
relief available under the doctine of Exparte Young).
68. Leahy and Brownback, supra note 29, at 455-56 (discussing the IPPRA of 2002).
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process under the Fourteenth Amendment6 9 or takes property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 0 Compensation
for such constitutional violations would be based on "the statutory
remedies available under the appropriate intellectual property
statute," and would include actual damages, profits, statutory
damages, costs, and fees, but would not include treble damages.71
This section also places the burden of proof on the state or state
instrumentality to show that the state provides an adequate remedy
for any deprivation of property resulting from a due process
violation.72
E.

Ownership of Intellectual Property by States Under the Draft
Leahy/Hatch Amendments

In addition to restoring federal remedies for infringements of
intellectual property by states, the draft Leahy/Hatch amendments
would limit ownership of intellectual property by states that have not
waived sovereign immunity relating to that property.73 Pursuant to
this purpose, the draft Leahy/Hatch amendments provide that a state
shall not be entitled to a patent, copyright protection, registration of a
trademark, or protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act
unless that state has waived its sovereign immunity.74 For example, a
75
new subsection (h) would be added to section 102 of the Patent Act
"stipulating that a state will not be entitled to a patent if 'that State
has not waived immunity ...from suit in Federal court ... for any
infringement of intellectual property protected under Federal law.' ",76
The draft Leahy/Hatch amendments make comparable changes to
section 105 of the Copyright Act, to section 1051 of the Lanham Act,
and to section 51 of the Plant Variety Protection Act.7 7 Other than
the changes to the purposes of the bill and a few other minor
changes,7 8 these draft revisions leave all other sections of the original
69. S. 1191, § 5(a).
70. Id. § 5(b).
71. Leahy and Brownback, supra note 29, at 455-56.
72. S. 1191, § 5(d)(2).

73. See Draft Revision of Bill S. 2031, supra note 56, at 40.
74. See id.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
76. Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendment Stiffens IP Protection, supra note 28, at 32
(quoting Draft Revision of S.2031, supra note 56, at 39-40).

77. Id.
78. The draft revision also adds provisions under which no remedies shall be awarded

to a nonconsenting state in any infringement action under federal patent and copyright
laws. Id.; see also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (describing the proposed
changes to the purposes of the bill).
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bill intact.79 Thus, the purpose of the draft Leahy/Hatch amendments
is to limit ownership of intellectual property by non-waiving states,
not merely to limit the ability of a non-waiving state to recover
damages for infringement of its intellectual property rights. In doing
so, the amendments would promote a greater incentive for states to
waive immunity.
II.

CURRENT ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPACT
ON STATES' INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Beginning with its landmark decision in Seminole Tribe of
° the Supreme
Florida v. Florida,"
Court has consistently invalidated
attempts by Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The
Court has struck down laws that permitted private individuals to sue
the states for monetary damages as a remedy against state violation of
various federal laws, including claims arising under unfair labor
standards, l age discrimination,82 discrimination on the basis of
disability,83 and infringement of federal intellectual property rights. 4
This Part reviews the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
with an emphasis on those decisions that impact state sovereign
immunity and federal intellectual property rights.
A.

HistoricalPerspective

The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[tihe Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign

79. See Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendment Stiffens IP Protection, supranote 28, at 32.
80. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
81. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1999) (holding that Congress's attempt
to abrogate state sovereign immunity in state courts under the Fair Labor Standards Act
exceeded its Article I powers).
82. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000) (holding that
Congress's attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act exceeded its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
83. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-64, 374 (2001)
(holding that Congress's attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the
Americans with Disabilities Act exceeded its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment).
84. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 691 (1999) (concluding that states' sovereign immunity was not validly abrogated by
the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (holding that abrogation of states' sovereign
immunity from patent infringement under the Patent Remedy Act is not valid legislation
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
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State."85 Congress ratified the Eleventh Amendment in 1795 in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.86
Although the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
only actions brought against a state by citizens of another state or
citizens of a foreign country, the Court has construed the Eleventh
Amendment more broadly.87 In Hans v. Louisiana,8 for example, the
Court held that citizens could not sue their own states in federal

court.89 In general, the Court has "understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition ... which it confirms."9 ° The Court has recognized

that this presupposition contains two parts: (1) each state is a
sovereign entity in the federal system, and (2) a sovereign entity is not
amenable to suit by an individual without its consent.9 ' In a long line

of cases, the Court, for more than a century, has reaffirmed that
federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting states " 'was not
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial
power of the United States.' "92 Although the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits suits against a state, the Court in Ex parte Young
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to allow suits against state
officers.93 As will become important when considering what remedies

are available to private parties against infringing states,94 the doctrine
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

86. 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 419, 419-21 (1793) (holding that a citizen of South Carolina could
sue the State of Georgia in federal court to recover money owed for provisions supplied to
the State during the Revolutionary War); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974)
(describing Chisholm's impact on the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment).
87. See generally JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987) (describing the history and

early interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment).
88. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
89. Id. at 18-21 (avoiding the anomaly of allowing citizens of a state to sue that state
in federal court, whereas citizens of another state could not do so). See generally Edward
A. Purcell, Jr., The ParticularlyDubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law,
Race, History, and "FederalCourts", 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927 (2002) (reviewing the historical
origins of Hans v. Louisiana and critiquing its use by the Rehnquist Court as support for
the Court's current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
90. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
91. Id. (citing Hans, 134 U.S. at 13).
92. Id. (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15). The Court listed twenty-five Supreme Court
decisions since 1890 that sustained this doctrine. Id. at 779 n.7.
93. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (concluding that where the suit
named the state official as defendant, the State was not being sued). The Ex parte Young
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity allows private citizens to petition a federal
court to enjoin state officials in their official capacity from engaging in future conduct that
would violate the Constitution or a federal statute. Id. at 159.
94. Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 8-9 (statement of James E. Rogan,
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent
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of Ex parte Young only allows a plaintiff to recover prospective

injunctive relief against a state officer. 95
B.

The Line of Cases Establishingthe CurrentEleventh Amendment
Doctrine
The Rehnquist Court has generally expanded the doctrine of

state sovereign immunity and consistently restricted Congress's
ability to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. 96 The line of
cases leading up to Florida Prepaid, College Savings, and Chavez

established the general rule that to determine whether Congress
effectively abrogated the states' sovereign immunity depends on

whether Congress has (1) " 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to
abrogate the immunity' " and (2) acted " 'pursuant to a valid exercise
of power.' " The first prong of this inquiry requires that "Congress's
intent to abrogate the States' immunity from suit must be obvious
from 'a clear legislative statement.'

""

Thus, "Congress may abrogate

the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal
court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language

of the statute." 99 In addressing the second prong of this inquiry, the
and Trademark Office) (noting that obtaining injunctive relief against future infringement
by a state official is a viable alternative given the constitutional problems inherent in
drafting legislation to effectively abrogate state sovereign immunity, although intellectual
property owners would prefer to obtain monetary damages against the state).
95. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159. As an exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity, Ex parte Young actions may seek only prospective injunctive relief and are not
entitled to an award of monetary damages or other retrospective relief. See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-69 (1974). To be entitled to injunctive relief, a plaintiff must
allege an ongoing or continuing violation of federal law. See Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997). Furthermore, the Ex parte Young exception only applies
to alleged violations of federal, not state, law. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
96. See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search
of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1011-12 (2000) (reviewing the current
Court's federalism jurisprudence in view of College Savings, Florida Prepaid,and Alden
and concluding that these decisions attempt to impose a vision of federalism by limiting
the remedial means by which Congress may enforce regulation of the states). For a
criticism of the Court's approach to state sovereign immunity, see generally Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987). Professor Amar argues
that "[a] state government that orders or allows its officials to violate citizens' federal
constitutional rights can invoke 'sovereign' immunity from all liability-even if such
immunity means that the state's wrongdoing will go partially or wholly unremedied." Id.
at 1425-26 (concluding that " 'sovereignty' has become an oppressive concept in our
courts").
97. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (quoting Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
98. Id. (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991)).
99. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 413 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
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Court considers whether Congress enacted the legislation pursuant to

a constitutional provision granting it the power to abrogate. l0 The
Court has recognized only one constitutional provision that grants
such power-Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 1 The only
other circumstance under which the Eleventh Amendment does not

bar an action against a state arises when the state waives its immunity
and consents to suit in federal court. 10 2
A line of United States Supreme Court cases beginning in the
mid-1980s established the current Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence.1"3 Even though these earlier cases do not involve
intellectual property rights, they provide the analytical framework
through which the Court decided the patent and Lanham Act
infringement issues in Florida Prepaidand College Savings.
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon1" the Court addressed

"whether States and state agencies are subject to suit in federal courts
by litigants seeking retroactive monetary relief under ... the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. .. or whether such suits are proscribed by
the Eleventh Amendment.""1 5 The Court in Atascadero held that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibited the suit against the State because
100. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56
(1976)).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress the power to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment through appropriate legislation). See Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (citing
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)). In determining whether Congress has
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by exercising its Fourteenth
Amendment powers, the Court has required "an unequivocal expression of congressional
intent." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). In
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), the Court held that the Interstate
Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id.
at 5. The Court, however, expressly overruled Union Gas seven years later in Seminole
Tribe. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
102. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). A state may waive its sovereign
immunity "by a state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its
immunity in the context of a particular federal program." Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1.
A state must waive its immunity by express language or by language that is not subject to
any other reasonable construction. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
103. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 1 n.2. Although the current Court consistently has upheld states'
sovereign immunity, the Court's hold on this doctrine is tenuous. See id. at 1 (noting a
slim five to four majority in virtually all of the Rehnquist Court's significant Eleventh
Amendment decisions). Thus, a change in the composition of the Court could signal a
shift in its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, although stare decisis could limit any
significant shifts in Eleventh Amendment doctrine. See Berman et al., supra note 27, at
1040-41 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence on state sovereign immunity).
104. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
105. Id. at 235.
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(1) provisions of the Act fell short of expressing an unequivocal
congressional intent to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment
immunity; (2) the Act did not manifest a clear intent to condition
participation in federally-funded programs on the State's consent to
waive its constitutional immunity; and (3) the State had not
specifically waived its immunity to suit in federal court. °6
Importantly, the Court declined the opportunity to reexamine the
historical and jurisprudential foundations of its Eleventh Amendment
doctrine, thereby continuing on the course initiated in Hans v.
Louisiana nearly one hundred years earlier." 7 The Court also
declined to adopt the view that the State consented to suit when it
willingly accepted federal funds under the Act and that Congress
legitimately abrogated the State's sovereign immunity as an exercise
of its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 10 8 The ultimate effect of Atascadero, however, is that
Congress may abrogate the states' sovereign "immunity from suit in
its intention unmistakably clear in the
federal court only by making
10 9
statute.
a
of
language
Following Atascadero, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Chew v. California"° and Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v.
Florida Department of Transportation.. upheld the states' sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from patent suits in
federal courts after determining that Congress did not express
adequately its intent to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity in
amendments to federal patent law. 12 In response to these two
Federal Circuit decisions, Congress in 1992, under the authority of
106. Id. at 241-47 (opinion by Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and White, Rehnquist,
& O'Connor, JJ.).
107. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (denying suits by individuals against
states); see Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247-78, 260-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing
disagreement with the court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine). Justice Stevens, in dissent,
argued that "a fresh examination of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence will
produce benefits that far outweigh 'the consequences of further unraveling the doctrine of
stare decisis' in this area of the law." Id. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fla. Dep't
of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 155 (1981)
(Stevens, J., concurring)). The Court declined to adopt this view. Id. at 243 n.3.
dissenting).
108. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 304 (Blackmun, J.,
109. Id. at 242.
110. 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
111. 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
112. See, e.g., Chew, 893 F.2d at 334 (finding that amendments to the Patent Act did
not contain the requisite unmistakable congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity). In particular, the court found that the general term "whoever" in the amended
Act lacked the requisite intent. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) ("[W]hoever without
authority makes, uses.., or sells any patented invention ...infringes the patent.").
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Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.," 3 in which the Court allowed

Congress to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
14
through legislation passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause,'
passed the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification
Act ("Patent Remedy Act"). 5 Congress passed this Act "[t]o clarify
that States ... are subject to suit in Federal court by any person for
infringement of patents and plant variety protections"1'16 The Act

made explicit in adding section 271(h) that "any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity" could be held

accountable for infringing a patent.117 Furthermore, section 296(a) of
the Act explicitly provided that a state "shall not be immune, under
the eleventh amendment ... from suit in Federal court ... for
The Court of Appeals for the Federal
infringement of a patent"'1'

Circuit, in its first foray into what would lead to the Supreme Court's
Florida Prepaid and College Savings decisions, found that the Act
cured the defect recognized in Chew and Jacobs Wind and properly

abrogated state sovereign immunity from suit under federal patent
laws.11 9

Congress's authority to use the Commerce Clause as a means of
abrogating state sovereign immunity was short-lived, however, as the
Court in Seminole Tribe explicitly overturned Union Gas and held
that Congress lacked authority under Article I of the Constitution to

abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court. 120 Although the Supreme Court explicitly overruled
Union Gas, it reaffirmed that Congress had the power to abrogate

state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
113. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
114. Id. at 5.
115. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h)-296 (2000)).
116. Id. at 4230 pmbl. In enacting this legislation, Congress made explicit its intent to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity from patent suits brought in federal court by exposing
states to the same legal and equitable remedies available against private parties. See id.
117. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2000).
118. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act § 2(a)(1)-(2)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296).
119. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress, in response to the Federal Circuit's decisions
in Chew and Jacobs Wind, amended the federal patent laws to unambiguously express its
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity), rev'd, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
120. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 61-63, 66 (1996). Subsequently, the
Court further held that Congress does not have the power under Article I to subject
nonconsenting states to suits from private individuals for damages in a state's own courts.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
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Amendment. 121 Thus, after Seminole Tribe, Congress may abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity if it unequivocally
expresses its intent to do so and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of
power. 2 2 Justice Stevens, in dissent, recognized the broad swath the
majority's decision would cut through potential suits against states in
federal court, including "those sounding in copyright and patent
law."1

23

C. Recent Cases Involving State Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual
Property
Seminole Tribe set the stage for two 1999 Supreme Court cases
that severely curtailed the right of private parties to sue states in
federal court for infringement of intellectual property rights. In
Florida Prepaid, the Court reaffirmed states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from patent infringement suits. 2 4 The Court likewise
reaffirmed states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from allegations
of false and misleading advertising under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act in College Savings.'25 The Fifth Circuit followed these cases in
reaffirming the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity for copyright
infringement suits and violations of the Lanham Act in Chavez.'26
These cases established the current Eleventh Amendment doctrine in
the context of balancing states' sovereign immunity against the
intellectual property rights of private parties.
1. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank
In Florida Prepaid,the Court addressed whether Congress, by
amending the patent laws in 1992,127 validly abrogated the states'
121. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (affirming its earlier decision in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
122. Id. at 55.
123. Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The decision in Seminole Tribe would indeed
place the viability of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act in
doubt. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Court's decision in FloridaPrepaid).
124. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630 (1999).
125. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
691 (1999).
126. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 2000).
127. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631. The Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act was codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (2000). Prior to this
legislation, the patent laws stated that "whoever without authority" made, used, or sold a
patented invention infringed the patent, without defining "whoever." Act of July 19, 1952,
Pub. L. No. 593, § 271, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000)).
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sovereign immunity from infringement suits pursuant to its authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 8 The Court held
that the amended statute could not be sustained as legislation enacted
to enforce the guarantees under the Due .Process Clause of the
1 29
Fourteenth Amendment.
In determining whether Congress's enactment of the Patent
Remedy Act validly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity, the
Court applied the analytical framework articulated in Seminole Tribe
and addressed two issues: (1) did Congress "unequivocally express[]
its intent to abrogate the immunity"; and (2) did Congress act
"pursuant to a valid exercise of power."130 First, the Court agreed
that in enacting the legislation, Congress made its intention to
abrogate the states' immunity "unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute" 3' 1 as required under Atascadero. The Court noted,
however, that whether Congress had the power to compel states to
32
waive their sovereign immunity was another matter.
Congress justified the Act under three sources of constitutional
authority: the Patent Clause, 33 the Commerce Clause,3 and Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 5 Initially, the Court noted that
Seminole Tribe clearly states that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers.1 36 Thus, the
Patent Remedy Act could not be upheld under either the Patent
Clause or the Commerce Clause.' 37 Next, the Court addressed
whether the Act was "appropriate" legislation pursuant to Section 5
128. FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 630.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 635 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).
131. Id. (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)) (noting that Congress's
intent to abrogate "could not have been any clearer" in § 296(a)); see also Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (articulating the requirement for
unmistakable clarity for the first time).
132. Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 635.
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Patent Clause provides that "Congress shall
have Power .... [tjo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." Id. § 8, cls. 1, 8.
134. Id. § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power
.... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." Id.
135. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. amend.
XIV, § 5. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[nlo State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. amend.
XIV, § 1 (providing what is commonly referred to as the Due Process Clause).
136. Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 636.
137. Id.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment in view of the construction of that
term in City of Boerne v. Flores.3 8 To make this determination, the

Court considered whether the Act could be viewed as remedial or
preventive legislation directed toward securing for patent owners the
protections available under the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 This
consideration requires identifying the "wrong" that Congress
intended to remedy.14 Here, the Court identified the wrong as the

"unremedied patent infringement by the States" and asserted that
such conduct "must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation
that Congress sought to redress" in the Patent Remedy Act.141 The
Court noted, however, that "Congress identified no pattern of patent
infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations.' '

42

Because of the lack of evidence of the perceived harm,

the Court concluded that the provisions of the Act were " 'out of
proportion' " to the supposed remedy or preventive effect and that
the Patent Remedy Act could not be interpreted as " 'responsive to,

or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.' ",143 The Court
reasoned that the indiscriminate scope of the Act ran counter to the
standards articulated in City of Boerne, and thus, the Act could not be
upheld.144

138. Id. at 637-38 (noting that the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), emphasized that Congress's enforcement power is remedial in nature). In City of
Boerne, the Court held that Congress cannot abrogate states' sovereign immunity under
Section 5 unless the legislation deters or remedies unconstitutional state conduct. City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). The Court also held that such legislation
must be tailored to reflect a congruence and proportionality between the identified injury
and the means to remedy the offending conduct. Id.
139. FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 639.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 640.
142. Id. (noting a House Report that acknowledged that " 'many states comply with
patent law' " and that provided only two examples of patent infringement suits against the
State; further, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit "identified only eight patentinfringement suits prosecuted against the States ...between 1880 and 1990"). But see id.
at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the unfairness of "strik[ing] down Congress's Act
based on an absence of findings supporting a requirement this Court had not yet
articulated").
143. Id. at 646-47 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532) (noting that Congress did
not limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such
as where a state refused to provide patent owners whose patents it had infringed a state
remedy or make an attempt to confine the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to
certain types of intentional infringement).
144. Id. at 647. As discussed in Part III.A.2.a, infra, Florida Prepaid established the
conditions under which legislation could meet the standards articulated in City of Boerne.
See infra notes 308-41 and accompanying text. This Comment asserts that the IPPRA of
2003 does not meet these standards, but appropriate legislation could. See infra Part V.E.
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2. College Savings Bank v. Florida PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
Expense Board
The companion case to Florida Prepaid, College Savings,
145
addressed whether the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
effectively permits suit against a state for alleged misrepresentation of
its own product. 4 6 In College Savings, the Court first addressed
1 47
whether the Act validly abrogated the State's sovereign immunity.
The defendant state entity, Florida Prepaid, argued that Congress had
not effectively abrogated sovereign immunity because the Act was
enacted pursuant to Congress's Article I powers.148 To counter this
argument, the plaintiff, College Savings, asserted that Congress also
enacted the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act to enforce the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'4 9 College Savings
further claimed that Congress passed the Act "to remedy and
prevent" deprivation of two types of property rights by the states:
"(1) a right to be free from a business competitor's false advertising
about its own product, and (2) a more generalized right to be secure
in one's business interest." 5 ° The Court concluded, however, that
neither of these assertions qualified as a property right protected by
the Due Process Clause.'51 The Court asserted that the "activity of
145. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (2000)).
146. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
668-69 (1999). The Act amended section 43(a) of the Lanham Act by defining "any
person" to include "any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity." Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act § 3(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (2000)). The Act further
provided that state entities "shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the
Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from
suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental
entity for any violation under this Act," and that remedies shall be available against state
entities "to the same extent as such remedies are available ... in a suit against" a non-state
entity. Id. § 3(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (2000)). The Court reasoned
that the Act possibly could be interpreted as permitting suits against a state because either
(1) it brings about a "constitutionally permissible abrogation of state sovereign immunity"
or (2) it "operates as an invitation to waiver of such immunity," which a state
automatically accepts "by engaging in the activities regulated by the Lanham Act."
College Savings, 527 U.S. at 669.
147. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 672.
148. Id. at 671-72. This argument is derived from Seminole Tribe, where the Court
held that "the power to 'regulate Commerce' conferred by Article I" did not give
Congress "authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity." Id. at 672 (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
149. Id. at 671.
150. Id. at 672.
151. Id. at 672-73 (noting that the Lanham Act's false-advertising provisions "bear no
relationship to any right to exclude" and Florida Prepaid's alleged misrepresentations
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doing business" is not property in the ordinary sense and that no
deprivation of property, and thus no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, occurred in this case.152
Next, the Court determined whether the State of Florida
voluntarily waived its sovereign immunity.'53 Neither party suggested
15 4
that Florida expressly consented to being sued in federal court.

Rather, College Savings maintained that the State "impliedly" or
"constructively" waived its immunity.'
In evaluating such a claim,
the Court first noted that it had stated in Atascadero that the "test for
determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federalcourt jurisdiction is a stringent one."'5 6 Furthermore, the Court noted
that in a long line of cases, it had held that the doctrine of
constructive waiver had no place in its sovereign immunity
jurisprudence. 5 7 The Court in College Savings thereby expressly
overruled the constructive waiver doctrine as articulated in Parden v.
Terminal Railway Co. of the Alabama State Docks Department5 8 and
reiterated that a state's waiver of immunity must be unequivocal. 5 9
Thus, College Savings supplies important precedent for any legislative

initiatives that condition a state's participation in the federal
intellectual property system on a conditional waiver of sovereign
immunity.
3. Chavez v. Arte PublicoPress
In Chavez, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the

concerned its own products, in which College Savings had no right to exercise dominion).
College Savings further argued that businesses are "property" within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause and that Congress legislates under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it enacts a law that prevents state interference with business. Id. at 675
(noting that false advertising interferes with business).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 676.
155. Id. In doing so, College Savings relied on Parden v. Terminal Railway of the
Alabama State Docks Department,377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
Id. In Parden, the Court held that states could constructively waive sovereign immunity
by engaging in ordinary commercial activities outside of their core sovereign powers.
Parden, 377 U.S. at 196 (stating that "when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its
own and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that
regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation").
156. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (providing that to
constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, "a state statute or constitutional
provision must "specify the state's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court").
157. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 678.
158. Parden,377 U.S. at 196-98.
159. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 678, 680.
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analytical framework of Florida Prepaid to the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act and the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act. 160
The court addressed whether Congress "properly exercised its
authority to subject states to suit in federal court" for violating the
Copyright and Lanham Acts. 6 ' The plaintiff, Chavez, asserted that
the University of Houston "infringed her copyright by continuing to
publish her book without her consent and violated the Lanham Act
by naming her, also without her permission, as the selector of plays in
another book it published."'6 2 The University contended that it
enjoyed immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh
Amendment.'63
Congress amended the Lanham Act"6 and the Copyright Act'6 5

to explicitly require states to submit to suit in federal court for
violating the provisions in these two Acts.'66 Whether Congress had
the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under these Acts,
however, remained in doubt.'67 In deciding this issue, the Fifth
Circuit followed the rule articulated in Seminole Tribe that

abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity turns on an
express statement of intent by Congress and a constitutionally valid
160. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 605-08 (5th Cir. 2000).
161. Id. at 603. A three-judge panel heard Chavez on remand for reconsideration in
light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida Prepaid and College Savings. Id. The
statutes under consideration in Chavez were the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act,
Pub. L. No. 102-542, § 3(b), 106 Stat. 3567, 3567-68 (1992) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1122 (2000)) and the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000). Id.
162. Id. The plaintiff in Chavez conceded that the Trademark Remedy Clarification
Act was not a valid exercise of legislative authority in view of College Savings and did not
seek to defend it. Id. at 604 n.3.
163. Id. at 603.
164. See Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567
(1992) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (2000)).
165. See Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749
(1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511 (2000)). Under this Act, Congress
"amended § 501(a) ...to make it clear that 'anyone' who was liable for [copyright]
infringement also included the State"; "added a new § 511(b), providing that a plaintiff
could recover the same remedies against an infringing State as it could from any other
defendant"; and added a new section 511(a), which explicitly provided that any state
"'shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment ...from suit in Federal
court. . . for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner ......."John T.
Cross, Suing the States for Copyright Infringement, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 337, 344-45 (20002001) (quoting Copyright Remedy Clarification Act § 2(a)(2) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 511(a))) (discussing the provisions and legislative history of the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act and noting that the "net effect of these three changes was to
make States liable for copyright infringement to the same extent as private parties").
166. Chavez, 204 F.3d at 603 (noting that by amending these acts, Congress fulfilled the
requirement of an express statement).
167. Id.
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exercise of power.1l 8
The first opinion by the Fifth Circuit in this case followed the
Parden theory, under which states may implicitly waive their
sovereign immunity,'169 and held 'that the-University could be sued in
federal court for violating the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act. 70
After remand for reconsideration in light of Seminole Tribe, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the implied waiver theory articulated in
Parden was no longer valid. 71 In this early round of the Chavez
litigation, the Fifth Circuit held that the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act and the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act were
invalid exercises of Congress's Article I legislative power. 172 The
Fifth Circuit further held that to uphold the statutes as valid exercises
of legislative power pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be "an impermissible end-run around
Seminole.1

73

The Fifth Circuit rejected Chavez's argument that abrogation of
a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act is justified under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment "because Congress acted to prevent States
from depriving copyright holders of their property without due
process of law.' ' 174 Following Florida Prepaid, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that, because Congress relied only on the Copyright Clause
of Article I in enacting the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, a
court may not consider another ground of constitutionality, i.e., the
Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress did not explicitly invoke. 75
168. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).
169. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
170. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 1995). For a thorough
review of the factual issues and the Fifth Circuit's earlier decisions in the Chavez case, see
generally, Peter Bray, Note, After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, Are States Subject to
Suit for Copyright Infringement?: The Copyright Remedy ClarificationAct and Chavez v.
Arte Publico Press, 36 HoUs. L. REV. 1531 (1999).
171. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir. 1998). The Supreme
Court expressly overruled Parden and its implied waiver theory in College Savings. See
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999)
("Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled.").
172. Chavez, 204 F.3d at 604 (providing the procedural history of the Chavez
litigation).
The Fifth Circuit reached this holding by viewing Seminole Tribe in
conjunction with City of Boerne. Id.
173. Id. The Fifth Circuit vacated this decision for en banc reconsideration, but the
case was remanded to the three-judge panel after the Supreme Court decided College
Savings and Florida Prepaid. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (noting that in Florida Prepaid,the Supreme Court declined to consider the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a basis for the Patent and Plant
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Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that the Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act did not properly enforce the Due Process Clause.17 6 The Fifth
Circuit noted, however, that, under Seminole Tribe, "Congress can

abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when acting to enforce
constitutional rights pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."17' 7 The court then applied the analytical framework

articulated in FloridaPrepaidby assessing (1) the nature of the injury
to be remedied; (2) Congress's consideration of the adequacy of state
remedies to78 redress the injury; and (3) the coverage of the
legislation.'

1

The injury resulting from a state's wrongful conduct must rise to
the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 179 When addressing
the nature of the injury to be remedied, a court will consider whether
the state's conduct evinced a pattern of constitutional violations. 8 '
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the legislative history for the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, although it documented
instances of copyright infringement, did not identify a pattern of
copyright infringement by the states. 8' In considering the second
prong of the analytical framework, the Fifth Circuit determined that
Congress "barely considered the availability of state remedies for
infringement.' 18 2 Finally, in examining the breadth of the coverage of
the legislation, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress did not
"confine the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types
of infringement ...or providing for suits only against States with
questionable remedies or a high incidence of infringement."'8 3 The
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act).
176. Id. at 605.
177. Id. The Fifth Circuit also noted, however, that under City of Boerne, "there must
be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end." Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 51920 (1997)).
178. Id.
179. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627,639-40 (1999).
180. See id. (finding no pattern of constitutional violations in the Patent Remedy Act).
181. Chavez, 204 F.3d at 606 (noting that a report by the Copyright Office documented
only seven incidents of state copyright infringement enabled by the Eleventh
Amendment). But see Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 14 (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office of the United States Library of Congress)
(observing that the fact that the legislative history of the Act did not meet the Court's
requirements, which were articulated a decade after Congress passed the Act, is not
unexpected).
182. Chavez, 204 F.3d at 606 (noting that only two allusions to state remedies appear in
the legislative history). Congress instead focused on the inadequacy of injunctive relief.
Id. at 606 n.8.
183. Id. at 607 (applying the third prong of the FloridaPrepaid analytical framework in

1096

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Fifth Circuit then concluded that the Copyright Remedy Clarifications4
Act was an improper exercise of Congressional legislative power.
Even proponents of earlier versions of the IPPRA of 2003 concede
that "it is difficult to find fault with the ruling in Chavez" in view of
the Court's precedent and the likelihood that the current Supreme
Court would find the Copyright Clarification Act unconstitutional.1 85
4. Other Relevant Supreme Court Cases Addressing State Sovereign
Immunity
Other cases decided concurrently with or subsequent to Florida
Prepaid and College Savings are also important in understanding the
current landscape of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. In Alden
v. Maine, 6 decided the same day as Florida Prepaid and College
Savings,'8 7 the Court held "that the powers delegated to Congress
under Article I ... do not include the power to subject nonconsenting
States to private suits for damages in state courts."'88 The importance
of Alden in the context of state sovereign immunity and intellectual
property rights is that nonconsenting states would retain their
immunity from intellectual property infringement suits even if
Congress granted concurrent jurisdiction over such suits.'89
Less than a year later, in Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents, 9 ' the
Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") contained "a clear statement of Congress's intent to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, but that the abrogation
exceeded Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."''
After
applying
the
"congruence
and
view of City of Boerne).

184. Id. (noting that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act was doomed in the wake
of FloridaPrepaidand Kimel).
185. Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 13-14 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office of the United States Library of Congress)
(providing an overview of Chavez and Rodriguez).
186. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
187. Id. at 711. In Alden, several probation officers brought a claim alleging that the
State of Maine, their employer, breached the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. Id.
188. Id. at 712 (affirming dismissal of the suit on the grounds of sovereign immunity).
189. Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 50 (testimony of Paul Bender, Professor,
Arizona State University College of Law and Counsel to Meyer & Klipper, PLLC); see
also Peter S.

Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from

Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1441-42
(2000) (arguing that states could preclude such suits under Alden v. Maine by not waiving
immunity to be sued in their own courts for violating federal intellectual property law).
190. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
191. Id. at 67. In Kimel, three sets of plaintiffs filed suit under the Age Discrimination
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proportionality" test from City of Boerne, the Court concluded that

the ADEA is not "appropriate legislation" under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 2 Kimel reaffirmed and exemplified the
Court's approach following Seminole Tribe and the Florida Prepaid

cases in determining whether legislative validly abrogates states'
sovereign immunity under Congress's Section 5 powers.
More recently, in Raygor v. Regents of the University of
Minnesota,193 the Court made it more difficult for individuals to sue
state universities.19 4 In Raygor, the employees of the University of
Minnesota alleged that the University discriminated against them on
the basis of age. 195 The Court affirmed the dismissal of the
employees' claims by the Minnesota Supreme Court and held that the

statute of limitations for state causes of action initiated against
nonconsenting state defendants, and subsequently dismissed under
the Eleventh Amendment, does not run based on the supplemental
jurisdiction granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). 196 In sum, these
decisions, along with Florida Prepaid and College Savings, severely

restrict Congress's power to subject nonconsenting states to suits by
private parties in federal court, including suits involving federal
intellectual property rights.

III. ARE THE IPPRA

OF 2003 AND THE DRAFT LEAHY/HATCH
AMENDMENTS CONSTITUTIONAL?

Legislators drafted the IPPRA of 2003 and its
consulting constitutional and intellectual property
that the legislation fully complied with the
Amendment jurisprudence."'
Senator Leahy

predecessors after
experts to ensure
Court's Eleventh
asserts that this

in Employment Act ("ADEA") seeking monetary damages for their state employers'
alleged discrimination on the basis of age. Id. at 66.
192. Id. at 82-83. First, the Court found that the "substantive requirements the ADEA
imposes on state and local governments are disproportionate to any unconstitutional
conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act." Id. at 83. Second, the Court's
examination of the legislative record indicated that Congress's extension of the ADEA to
the states was "an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem" because
"Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any
discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation." Id. at 89.
193. 534 U.S. 533 (2002).
194. Andrew Viccora, Enrollment Management Report, May 8, 2002, LEXIS, News &
Business, News, News File (quoting William Thro, General Counsel for Christopher
Newport University) (discussing the impact of Raygor on the ability of private parties to
sue public universities).
195. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 536.
196. Id. at 548.
197. See Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 4 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy
from the State of Vermont).
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legislation is constitutional because "Congress may attach conditions
to a State's receipt of federal intellectual property protection under
its Article I intellectual property power just as Congress may attach
conditions on a State's receipt of federal funds under its Article I
spending power."198 Under this reasoning, "the power to attach

conditions to the federal benefit is part of the greater power to deny
the benefit altogether."'

199

Opponents of such legislation argue,

however, that components of the legislation are unconstitutional.2°
Whether this assertion can be sustained requires a close examination
of the language and legislative history of the IPPRA of 2003 in view

of the line of cases that established the Court's current Eleventh
Amendment doctrine and other pertinent constitutional doctrines.2 °'
The provisions in the IPPRA of 2003, its predecessor Acts, and
the draft Leahy/Hatch amendments operate under theories of
abrogation,2 2 the availability of suit against state officers or
employees,20 3 and conditional waiver.2 4 These provisions implicate

different constitutional doctrines in addition to those articulated
under the Court's current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The
abrogation provisions of section 5 of the IPPRA of 2003 implicate the
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence established by Florida Prepaid,
College Savings, Chavez, and their predecessor cases. 2 5
The

availability of suits against state officers or employees implicates the
doctrine of Ex parte Young, which operates as an exception to state
sovereign immunity. 2 6 The conditional waiver provisions of section 3
of the IPPRA of 2003 and new section 3 as proposed in the draft

198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., id. at 33-34 (statement of William E. Thro, General Counsel,
Christopher Newport University, Newport News, Virginia).
201. See supra notes 80-196 and accompanying text (describing the line of cases
establishing current Eleventh Amendment doctrine).
202. See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th
Cong. § 5 (2003) (explaining that states will be held liable for violating the property rights
of patent owners), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
203. See id. § 4.
204. See id. § 3; see also Draft Revision of S. 2031, supra note 56, at 39-40. Although
this bill contains separate provisions for waiver and abrogation, Justice Scalia wrote in
College Savings that "forced waiver and abrogation are not even different sides of the
same coin-they are the same side of the same coin." Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 683 (1999). The "forced waiver" to
which Justice Scalia refers would indeed result from the enactment of the IPPRA of 2003.
Such forced waiver is distinguished from the "voluntary waiver" advocated by some
commentators. See Part V.A.
205. See infra Part III.A.
206. See infra Part III.B.

2004]

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

1099

Leahy/Hatch amendments implicate the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. 2 7 These provisions and the constitutional doctrines that
they evoke will be discussed in turn in the following Sections of this
Comment.
A.

Does the IPPRA of 2003 Effectively Abrogate the States'
Sovereign Immunity?

Under the Eleventh Amendment doctrine established by Florida
Prepaid, College Savings, Chavez, and their predecessor cases,
whether Congress has effectively abrogated the states' sovereign
immunity depends on if it " 'unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the immunity' " and acted " 'pursuant to a valid exercise of
power.' ,208 The following sections address whether the IPPRA of
2003 satisfies this two-prong test.
1. Did Congress Unequivocally Express Its Intent to Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity?
Congress may abrogate the states' sovereign immunity " 'only by
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.' "209 The courts in Florida Prepaid, College Savings, and
Chavez each found, with little trouble, that, in enacting the Patent,
Trademark, and Copyright Remedy Clarification Acts, Congress
explicitly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 21 Likewise,
the express language and legislative history of the IPPRA of 2003
clearly indicate Congress's intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity to restore federal remedies for infringements of intellectual
property by the states. 11

207. See infra Part III.C.
208. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (quoting Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
209. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
210. See supra notes 127-85 and accompanying text (discussing Florida Prepaid,
College Savings, and Chavez).
211. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong.
pmbl. (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Section
2(4) of the IPPRA of 2003 expressly states that the purpose of the bill is to "abrogate State

sovereign immunity in cases where States ... infring[e] Federal intellectual property."
Id. § 2(4). This express language in the IPPRA of 2002, however, was stricken by the draft

Leahy/Hatch amendments and replaced by more general language providing
"compensation for harm from infringements of Federal intellectual property by
States...." See Draft Revision ofS. 2031, supra note 56, at 39. Whether the more general
language contained in the draft Leahy/Hatch amendments would make Congress's intent

to abrogate state sovereign immunity "unmistakably clear" is uncertain.
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2. Did Congress Act Pursuant to a Valid Exercise of Power?

This inquiry focuses on whether Congress enacted the legislation
pursuant to a constitutional provision granting it the power to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.2 12 Article I provides the
constitutional basis for most federal statutes, including the statutory
provisions governing intellectual property rights-the Patent and

Copyright Acts were created under the specific powers provided in
section 8, clause 8, whereas the Lanham Act stems primarily from the
Interstate Commerce Clause provided in section 8, clause 3.213 When

Congress enacted the Patent and Copyright Remedy Clarification
Acts of 1990, the legislative history cited Congress's Article I powers
under the Patent and Copyright Clause as providing the
constitutional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 2 4 The
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, however, restricts Congress's
ability to regulate the states under its Article I powers. 215 Likewise, in
Florida Prepaid, the Court, in construing the Patent Remedy Act,
concluded that even though the aims of the statute, i.e., providing a

uniform remedy for patent infringement and placing states on the
same footing as private parties, are proper Article I concerns under
212. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56
(1976)).
213. John T. Cross, Intellectual Property and the Eleventh Amendment After Seminole
Tribe, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 519, 526 (1998) (discussing the origins of intellectual property
rights under Article I).
214. See Cross, supra note 165, at 346 (discussing the legislative history of the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 and noting, at the time, the abrogation
provisions likely were sustainable under Union Gas). The legislative history of the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act is available at H.R. Rep. No. 101-282, pt. 3, at 11
(1989), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3959 (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/8:101-282) and S. Rep. No.
101-305, pt. 4, at 13 (1989) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:101-305). Professor Cross notes,
however, that, in contrast to the legislative history of the Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act, the legislative history of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act explicitly mentions the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for the
legislation. Cross, supra note 165, at 356.
215. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (ruling that the Indian Commerce clause does
not give Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity); see also Cross, supra
note 213, at 519-20 (noting that Congress may still impose liability on the states through
its Article I powers, but it must turn to state courts for the adjudication of most lawsuits
brought against the states). Professor Cross notes that certain exceptions to state
immunity exist after Seminole Tribe, including suits by the federal government against a
state, Supreme Court review of state high court decisions in suits against a state, a state's
power to waive its immunity, and suits by one state against another. Cross, supra note 213,
at 520 n.4. Most of these exceptions, however, do not arise in federal intellectual property
litigation. Furthermore, although Congress may assign adjudication of suits against a state
to state courts, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright cases.
Id. at 522 (noting that under this scheme a private patent or copyright owner has no
judicial remedy against a state).
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the Patent Clause, Congress does not have power to enact such

legislation after Seminole Tribe.2 16 Thus, the abrogation provisions of
the IPPRA of 2003 cannot be sustained under either the Patent
Clause or the Commerce Clause and must rely on another
constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. 2 7 To that end, the Court has recognized

only one constitutional provision, Section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment, as granting Congress such power.2 t8
The Court in Seminole Tribe concluded that Congress may
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when acting to enforce
constitutional rights pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 9 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants
Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment through appropriate legislation. 22° The Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees, inter alia, that a state may not deprive any
person of property without due process of law nor deny any person
equal protection under the law. 22 ' Along these lines, the Court in
Seminole Tribe explicitly approved of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, which
upheld congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 3
Congress must specifically call on its Section 5 powers when
enacting legislation to remedy state misconduct. In doing so, a court
may not consider another ground of constitutionality that Congress
did not explicitly invoke. 2 4 In contrast to the Patent, Trademark, and
216. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
647 (1999).
217. Id. at 635-36.
218. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
670 (1999); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress
could abrogate states' sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its enforcement
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
219. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 (indicating that the rationale articulated in
Fitzpatrickdoes not apply to the Commerce Clause).
220. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
221. Id. § 1 (containing the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
222. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
223. Id. at 456 (finding federal jurisdiction over a suit by employees against the State
for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
224. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Chavez concluded that because Congress relied
only on the Copyright Clause of Article I in enacting the Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act, the court could not consider the Fourteenth Amendment in determining the
constitutionality of the Act. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir.
2000) (noting that in Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court declined to consider the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a basis for the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act).
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Copyright Remedy Clarification Acts at issue in Florida Prepaid,
College Savings, and Chavez, the IPPRA of 2003 explicitly makes

states liable for constitutional violations under the Fourteenth
Amendment involving intellectual property. 225 Section 5(a) of this
226
Act invokes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

and section 5(b) invokes the Takings Clause of the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments. 227 Thus, the IPPRA of 2003 would not
meet the same fate as the Acts struck down in Florida Prepaid,
College Savings, and Chavez for lacking constitutional authority to
abrogate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The analysis does not, however, stop with the text of the
legislation. Under City of Boerne, when Congress acts under its
Section 5 powers, "there must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end. '228 The Court set forth the analytical framework
in Florida Prepaid for determining whether Congress validly

abrogated state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment by requiring an examination of the following

three aspects of the legislation: (1) the nature of the injury to be
remedied; (2) Congress's consideration of the adequacy of state
remedies to redress the injury; and (3) the coverage, or scope, of the
legislation.22 9

a. The Nature of the Injury To Be Remedied
To determine if the IPPRA of 2003 is "appropriate" legislation2 30
225. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong. § 5
(2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).

226. Id. § 5(a). Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not
deprive any person of property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(containing what is commonly referred to as the "Due Process Clause").
227. S. 1191, § 5(b). The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing what is
commonly referred to as the "Takings Clause"). This provision of the Bill of Rights was
the first to be applied to the states. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.4.1, at 615 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the origin and purposes
of the Takings Clause).
228. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
229. See Chavez, 204 F.3d at 605 (summarizing the analytical framework articulated in
FloridaPrepaidand noting that the Supreme Court reconfirmed this framework in Kimel).
230. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
638 (1999) (noting that the Court in City of Boerne emphasized that Congress's
enforcement power is remedial in nature). In City of Boerne, the Court held that
Congress cannot abrogate states' sovereign immunity under Section 5 unless the
legislation deters or remedies unconstitutional state conduct. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
519. Under City of Boerne, such legislation must be tailored to reflect a congruence and
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pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a court will
consider whether the bill can be viewed as remedial or preventive
legislation intended to protect intellectual property owners. 231 This

inquiry requires identifying the "wrong" that Congress intends to
remedy.23 2 The legislative history of the IPPRA of 2003 and its
predecessor bills indicates that the "wrong" identified by Congress is
infringement of privately-owned intellectual property rights by the

states.233 This "wrong," i.e., the states' conduct, must give rise to the
Fourteenth Amendment violation that Congress seeks to redress.234
One criterion that a court will consider in determining if the
states' conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment is whether
Congress has identified a pattern of patent infringement by the
states. 235 For example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the legislative
history for the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, although it
documented instances of copyright infringement, did not identify a

pattern of copyright infringement by the states.236 Opponents of the
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001 ("IPPRA of
2001") argued that the Act would not withstand Supreme Court
review because the states were not engaged in a widespread practice
of infringing intellectual property rights. 23 7 These opponents argued
that such legislation was flawed because it attempted to solve a
problem that did not exist. 238 In support of this proposition,
opponents of such legislation pointed to a study conducted by the

General Accounting Office ("GAO"), requested by Senator Orrin
Hatch, that identified only fifty-eight lawsuits in state and federal
proportionality between the identified injury and the means to remedy the offending
conduct. Id. at 520.
231. FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 639.
232. Id. at 639-40.
233. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Patrick J.
Leahy from the State of Vermont) (discussing the "wrong" identified by Congress in
drafting the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001).
234. FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 640.
235. Id. (noting that a House Report provided only two examples of patent
infringement suits against the State, and the Federal Circuit decision in the instant case
identified only eight patent infringement suits prosecuted against the states between 1880
and 1990). But see Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal
Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1347 (2001) (interpreting
FloridaPrepaidas not requiring a showing of widespread violations to validate an exercise
of Congress's Section 5 powers).
236. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that a
report by the Copyright Office documented only seven incidents of state copyright
infringement enabled by the Eleventh Amendment).
237. See Hearing on S.1611, supra note 14, at 31-38 (statement of William E. Thro,
General Counsel, Christopher Newport Univ., Newport News, Virginia).
238. Id. at 32.
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courts since 1985 in which a state was a defendant in an action
involving the unauthorized use of intellectual property. 239 Forty-

seven of these lawsuits were heard in federal court, accounting for
less than 0.05% of the nearly 105,000 intellectual property related
lawsuits filed in federal district courts during this time period.240
Thus, absent a pattern of infringement by the states, any legislative

act abrogating the states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment from intellectual property infringement suits in federal
court would likely not withstand Supreme Court review.24'
b. Did Congress Consider the Adequacy of State Remedies?
The unavailability of adequate remedies under state law triggers
a due process violation by the state. The Court, in Florida Prepaid,
held that "only where the State provides no remedy, or only

inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of
their patent could a deprivation of property without due process"
occur. 242 In Chavez, for example, the Fifth Circuit determined that
Congress "barely considered the availability of state remedies for
infringement. '243 This issue was addressed, however, by proponents
of the IPPRA of 2001 in testimony before the Committee on the
Judiciary, who argued that under the current statutory scheme,

239. U.S.
IN

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATE IMMUNITY
INFRINGEMENT
ACTIONS
2 (Sept. 2001)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT],

http://archive.gao.gov/new.items/d01811.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). But see Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of James Rogan,
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent
and Trademark Office) (noting that until 1999 states were thought to be liable for
damages for infringing intellectual property rights of others, and thus the states had an
incentive to avoid infringement). Furthermore, Mr. Rogan noted that the GAO report
relied on self-reporting by state universities and state attorneys general and that state
entities often handle accusations of infringement through administrative procedures, both
of which might have resulted in the underreporting of state infringement. Id.
240. See GAO REPORT, supra note 239, at 2.
241. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 640-41 (1999). But see Meltzer, supra note 239, at 1348 (arguing that such provisions
could be viewed as "remedial" and should not require a showing of widespread violations
by the states, and that an examination of the record of state violations is significant only
when a statute reaches beyond the scope of constitutional violations). Professor Meltzer
concludes that a limited measure providing redress for only intentional infringement
where no adequate state remedy is afforded would pass constitutional muster. Id. at 135052. He concedes, however, that Congress should assemble the most complete record
possible of state violations of federal intellectual property laws. Id.
242. FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 643.
243. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that only
two allusions to state remedies appear in the legislative history). Congress instead focused
on the inadequacy of injunctive relief. Id. at 606 n.8.
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intellectual property owners have few proven alternatives or remedies
against infringing state entities.24 In support of this assertion, these
proponents pointed to the GAO report that noted an absence of
viable alternatives under state-law remedies for the infringement of
intellectual property by states. 245 Furthermore, whatever remedies
are available under state law are largely untested, and in any event,
are likely to be inadequate. 246 For example, under existing law, an
intellectual property owner might be able to obtain injunctive relief in
federal court against a state official or employee to stop the ongoing
infringement, but could not recover damages.2 47
The availability of remedies under state law is limited by 28
U.S.C. § 1338, which gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over
civil actions arising under federal intellectual property law.248
Furthermore, the Copyright Act preempts all rights provided under
state law that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided in
the Act.249 As a result, proponents of the IPPRA of 2001 concluded
that "the alternatives to bringing an infringement suit against a State
in federal court are, at best, uncertain. ' '25 ° This uncertainty is
countered, however, by provisions in the Act that place the burden of
proof upon a state to prove that it provides adequate remedies for
any deprivation of rights suffered by owners of intellectual property
rights.251
c. Is the Scope of the IPPRA of 2003 Proportional to the
Nature of the Injury?
In City of Boerne, the Court held that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a remedial provision, and although it gives
244. Hearing on S. 1611, supra note

14,

at 6

(statement

of James

Rogan,

Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent
and Trademark Office).
245. Id. at 7; see GAO REPORT, supra note 239, at 1.
246. Hearing on S.1611, supra note 14, at 10

(statement

of James

Rogan,

Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent
and Trademark Office).
247. See GAO REPORT, supra note 239, at 13.
248. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (providing federal jurisdiction for actions arising under
the Patent, Copyright, and Plant Variety Protection Acts); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a)

(granting federal courts original jurisdiction over trademark infringement suits).
249. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
250. Hearing on S. 1611, supra note

14,

at

8

(statement

of James

Rogan,

Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent
and Trademark Office).
251. Id. at 24 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual
Property Law Association) (discussing the provisions in section 5(c)(2) of the bill).
Whether this type of burden shifting is allowed under City of Boerne is unclear.
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Congress the authority to enact legislation to enforce state
constitutional violations, it does not give Congress the authority to
create new limitations on state conduct.252 Under this doctrine, a law
is valid only if there is "a congruence and proportionality between the

injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.

' 253

Congress may enact a broader statute only upon a finding

that serious and widespread violations of the Fourteenth Amendment
are actually occurring. 254 Applying this principle in Florida Prepaid,

the Court concluded, because of the lack of evidence of the perceived
harm, that the provisions of the Patent Remedy Act were out of
proportion to the supposed remedy or preventive effect and that they

cannot be interpreted as being responsive to or designed to prevent
unconstitutional behavior. 255 Thus, the Court reasoned that the
indiscriminate scope of the Act runs counter to the standards
articulated in City of Boerne.256 In addition, the Court found the

Patent Remedy Act to be overly broad in two respects: first, the Act
created liability regardless of whether the infringer acted
intentionally, negligently, or innocently; and second, because it made

a state liable for patent infringement whether or not the state
provided adequate process. 25 7 Consistent with these principles, the
Fifth Circuit in Chavez, when examining the breadth of the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act, concluded that Congress did not confine
the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of
infringement or providing for suits only against states with inadequate
remedies or a high incident of infringement.25 8 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the Act was an improper exercise of Congress's

252. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (citing South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
253. Id. at 520.
254. Id. at 533-34.
255. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
646-47 (1999) (noting that Congress did not limit the coverage of the Act to cases
involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a state refuses to provide any
remedies in state court for patent owners whose patents it infringed, or to make an
attempt to confine the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of
intentional infringement).
256. Id. at 647.
257. Cross, supra note 165, at 353-55 (discussing the Court's decision in Florida
Prepaid). The Court in FloridaPrepaid found that a negligent or accidental infringement
of a patent by a state would not deprive the owner of property and therefore could not
violate the owner's due process rights. Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 645. Similarly, the
Court found that the provisions of the Act could reach cases in which no due process
violation had occurred. Id. at 643.
258. Id.
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legislative power.259
Supporters of the IPPRA of 2001 argued that the scope of the
legislation is appropriate because the abrogation provision removed
state immunity only in those instances where state infringement
resulted in the unconstitutional deprivation of the property rightsthat is, where such deprivations of property violated either the Due
Process or the Takings Clause-of private intellectual property
owners. 260 These proponents asserted, however, that even if section 5
of the Act were to be found constitutional under the Court's analysis
in Florida Prepaid, this section would not "address the full range of
state infringement of intellectual property. ' 261 Nonetheless, a broader
statute may raise constitutional concerns. 62 So long as the scope of
the abrogation provision is narrowly tailored to the problem
presented by constitutional violations, this provision of any version of
the IPPRA, on its face, should be constitutional. 6 3
B.

Are the Provisionsof the IPPRA of 2003 Consistent with the
Doctrine of Ex Parte Young?

Prospective injunctive relief, and presumably declaratory
judgment, against infringing state action is still available to private
intellectual property owners after College Savings and Florida
Prepaid.6 Under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, such suits must be
filed against a state official and not the state or the state entity
2 66
itself.265 As such, they are not barred by state sovereign immunity.
259. Id. at 608 (noting that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act was doomed in the
wake of FloridaPrepaidand Kimel).
260. See Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 40-58 (statement of Paul Bender,
Professor, Arizona State University College of Law and Counsel to Meyer & Klipper,
PLLC).
261. See id. at 8 (statement of James E. Rogan, Undersecretary of Commerce for
Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office).
262. Id. (noting that such legislation must be drafted as a remedy that is "proportional
and congruent" to instances of state infringement).
263. See Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1055 (concluding that similar abrogation
provisions in the IPPRA of 1999 likely would be found constitutional).
264. See Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1334 (discussing the remedies available to
intellectual property owners under the Court's current Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence). But see Vicki C. Jackson, Article, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh
Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495,
530-38 (1997) (speculating that the availability of injunctive relief against state officials is
no longer a given).
265. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (holding that officers of the State
charged with enforcement of provisions later found to be unconstitutional may be
enjoined).
266. See Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1334 (summarizing the doctrine of Ex parte
Young).
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The doctrine of Ex parte Young does not, however, provide a

mechanism by which a private intellectual property owner may
recover damages for infringement that has already occurred.26 7

Nonetheless, if such infringement continues in violation of an
injunctive order, a private intellectual property owner may be able to
obtain compensation from the state itself for harm suffered after the
injunction was ordered.26
The drawback to this approach is that the state entity does not
risk liability until an injunction is issued and, therefore, lacks any
incentive under the current state of the law to take corrective
action. 69 One commentator has suggested that injunctive relief
would be more useful if Congress extended the availability of

attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 70

Consistent with this

suggestion, section 4 of the IPPRA of 2003 provides for the awarding
of attorneys' fees.27 1
Section 4 of the IPPRA of 2003 also provides for monetary
damages against state officers or employees, which expands on the
injunctive relief available under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.272

This provision might effectively deter state officers from carrying out
infringing acts, but otherwise would not be an effective remedy for
private intellectual owners, who would much rather have access to the

deep pockets of the state treasury. Furthermore, state officers can
possess a qualified immunity27 3from damages, which may further limit
the efficacy of this provision.

267. See Malin, supra note 27, at 165 (noting that the doctrine of Ex parte Young at
least negates ongoing state infringement even though no damages may be awarded).
Some courts have held, however, that a state official may be personally liable for damages
for copyright infringement. See Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114,
122 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1335 (noting that such awards are
not barred by sovereign immunity because they are not paid out of the state treasury).
268. See Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1334 n.17 (noting that such an award is a form of
compensation for civil contempt that does not violate the Eleventh Amendment).
269. See id. at 1337.
270. See id. at 1334 n.17 (noting that current intellectual property statutes provide for
an award of fees where the defendant's conduct is willful).
271. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong. § 4
(2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
272. Id.; see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (allowing suits for injunctive
relief but not suits for monetary damages against state officials).
273. See Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1357 (noting that such compensation may only be
available when the state officer's conduct clearly violated established law).
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Do the Conditional Waiver Provisionsof the IPPRA of 2003 and
the Draft Leahy/Hatch Amendments Violate the Doctrine of
UnconstitutionalConditions?

Whether Congress may use federal benefits to encourage states
to waive their sovereign immunity falls under the doctrine of
This doctrine provides that "the
unconstitutional conditions.
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right.., in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government." '7 4 After Seminole Tribe, which effectively eliminated
Congress's use of Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign

immunity, many commentators advocated waiver of immunity as the
most effective means of assuring that state entities remain
accountable for violating federal intellectual property law.275 Waiver

provisions circumvent the need for an explicit abrogation of state
sovereign immunity.2 76 The district court in an early round of the
Florida Prepaid litigation held, however, that "Congress may no
longer utilize its Article I powers to elicit a waiver of sovereign
immunity as a condition for participating in a field subject to
congressional regulation. '277 The Court's decision in College Savings

cast further doubt on the ability of Congress to condition receipt of
federal intellectual property protection on a state's waiver of
sovereign immunity.27 8 Whether such waivers are valid is an open
question of constitutional law. 279 Nevertheless, the IPPRA of 2003
and the draft Leahy/Hatch amendments both contain conditional

waiver provisions.80
274. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) (arguing that
"[g]overnment may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right").
275. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1371-89 (discussing several approaches based
on a state's waiver of immunity); Poise, supra note 21, at 519-20 (advocating extracting an
express waiver from the states as the best method for ensuring that state universities
remain accountable for violating federal patent laws, but noting that an express waiver
would be unsatisfactory because it requires explicit voluntary consent by each state and
the state could withdraw its consent at any time).
276. See Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1130 (advocating the use of waiver of
immunity provisions).
277. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp.
400, 416 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3rd Cir. 1997) and 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
1998), affd in part by 527 U.S. 666 (1999), rev'd in part by 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
278. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
279. See Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1146 (noting that a state waiver of immunity
provision may be vulnerable to attack as a violation of constitutional rights).
280. See Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003),
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At first blush, the IPPRA of 2003, or any legislation that
attempts to use Congress's Article I powers-e.g., those under the
Patent Clause-to force states to waive sovereign immunity would
meet the same fate as the intellectual property remedy acts struck
down in College Savings and Florida Prepaid. Proponents of
predecessor bills to the IPPRA of 2003 argued, however, that such
legislation is constitutional because, just as Congress may attach
conditions on a state's receipt of federal funds under its Article I
spending power, Congress may attach conditions to a state's receipt
of federal intellectual property protection under its Article I
intellectual property powers.
In support of this proposition,
Senator Leahy argued that "the power to attach conditions to the
Federal benefit [i.e., intellectual property protection]
is part of the
282
greater power to deny the benefit altogether.
The theory behind the conditional waiver approach is that
Congress need not create intellectual property rights. Under this
reasoning, the rights that states enjoy under federal intellectual
property laws are gratuities, and Congress may condition a grant of
such gratuities on a state waiving its sovereign immunity. Thus,
Congress may require that a state cannot obtain new intellectual
property rights unless it agrees to waiver from suit under federal
intellectual property law.283
Although the Court explicitly overruled the constructive waiver
doctrine in College Savings, it distinguished between a constructive
waiver under the Parden theory and a waiver that arises out of a
state's acceptance of a federal gift or gratuity that is conditioned on a
waiver of immunity.2" Because of this distinction, one commentator
has suggested that College Savings permits Congress to condition
receipt of federal benefits on the state's waiver of sovereign immunity
from suit in federal court.285 The Court has not addressed whether
http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Draft
Revision of S.2031, supra note 56, at 39-40 (noting that the revised text of the IPPRA of
2002 contains new provisions allowing conditional waiver).
281. 148 CONG. REC. S2079 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see
also Polse, supra note 21, at 524 (analogizing the granting of patent rights to grants of
funding under the Spending Clause).
282. 148 CONG. REC. S2079 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting
that the federal government does not need to grant states patents at all).
283. See Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1380-81 (describing the basic approach of a
conditional waiver scheme and noting that it is difficult to assess the constitutionality of
such an approach).
284. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 686-87 (1999).
285. See Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity:

State
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conditioning receipt of federal funding on a waiver of sovereign
immunity is constitutional, although several cases in the circuit
courts
2 86
requirement.
waiver
a
of
constitutionality
the
upheld
have
Language in College Savings suggests, however, that the Court
has elevated state sovereign immunity to the level of a constitutional
right.287 Thus, opponents of the IPPRA of 2001 argued that the
conditional waiver provisions of the Act violated the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.288
Historically, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has been applied to conditions placed on
government benefits that restrict the rights of individuals. 289 The
doctrine also has been used, however, to invalidate legislation that
conditions receipt of federal benefits, and thus shifts power from the
states to the federal government in violation of federalism
principles. 29 ° This context is relevant to the determination of whether
Congress may condition receipt of federal intellectual property
21
protection in exchange for a waiver of state sovereign immunity.
The inquiry into whether particular legislation violates the
doctrine of unconditional conditions focuses on two factors:
(1) whether the condition placed on the benefit is germane to the
purpose of granting the benefit, and (2) whether the federal
inducement is so coercive as to compel the state to consent to the

Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 287 (2002).
Professor Bohannan notes, however, that College Savings created "quite a stir," and some

commentators have speculated on "whether. and under what circumstances Congress may
condition a state's receipt of a federal benefit on its waiver of sovereign immunity." Id. at
308. For example, public universities that accept federal funding waive their sovereign
immunity for certain claims, including those brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. See Viccora, supra note 194 (noting that the ADA does not yet have a waiver
provision).
286. See Bohannan, supra note 285, at 303 n.145 (listing circuit court decisions
addressing whether states waived their immunity by accepting certain federal funding or
participating in particular spending programs).
287. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 687 (stating that "where the constitutionally
guaranteed protection of the states' sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion
is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of waiver is destroyed-when what is
attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful
activity").
288. See Hearing on S.1611, supra note 14, at 32-35 (statement of William E. Thro,
General Counsel, Christopher Newport University, Newport News, Virginia).
289. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1936) (finding that a tax imposed
on processors of farm products amounted to economic coercion).
290. See id.
291. See Bohannan, supra note 285, at 305-08 (providing a brief review of cases that
address the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions).

1112

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

condition. 2
The germaneness test focuses on whether the
"conditions ...bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal
'
[benefit]."293
To that end, "conditions on federal grants might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs.' "294 The conditional waiver provisions
of the IPPRA of 2003 tie a state's waiver of immunity from damages
brought in intellectual property suits directly to the ability of a state
to collect damages from parties infringing the state's intellectual
property. 295 Thus, the germaneness requirement would not likely be
an obstacle to legislation granting federal intellectual property
296
benefits in exchange for waiver of state sovereign immunity.
The coercion prong of the analysis might be more problematic
for this type of legislation. The Court has stated that unconstitutional
coercion may occur when an "inducement offered by Congress [is] so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion.' ",297 The Court in College Savings asserted that "the
point of coercion is automatically passed" where the states' sovereign
immunity is involved.298 One interpretation of this language suggests
that the Court is stating that "a benefit offered to a state by Congress
Will be constitutional if it is in the nature of 'a gift or gratuity,' but
unconstitutional if it is more in the nature of a 'sanction.' ",299 Such a
sanction would constitute an "exclusion of the State from an
otherwise permissible activity."3 °
Whether federal intellectual property rights constitute a "gift or
gratuity" under the meaning of College Savings was at issue in

292.
293.
294.
States,

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting the plurality opinion in Massachusetts v. United
435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)). Some commentators question, however, if Dole, which

addressed a spending power, would be applied to a condition placed on the conferring of
intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1373-89 (distinguishing
between conditions based on the spending power and those based on Congress's authority
under the patent and copyright clause).
295. See supra Part I.B (outlining the waiver provisions of the IPPRA of 2003).
296. See Bohannan, supra note 285, at 312-13 (noting that the Court has not struck
down a statute on grounds of germaneness in the context of Federalism since the New
Deal, and arguing that courts would find Congress's decision to condition funds on waiver
of immunity to be sufficiently germane to the purpose of the legislation).
297. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
298. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
687 (1999).
299. Bohannan, supra note 285, at 317.
300. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 687.
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discussions surrounding earlier versions of the IPPRA of 2003.31
Senator Leahy espoused the view that the grant of federal intellectual
property rights is indeed a gift or gratuity, much like the grants that
Congress makes pursuant to its spending power.3 °2
Support for this view is found in a textual interpretation of the
Constitution, which does not explicitly confer intellectual property
rights.30 3 One commentator concludes, however, that "[g]iven the
long history ... of federal intellectual property rights, it seems likely

that the Court will include federal patents and copyrights in the set of
baseline entitlements and thus classify their denial as unconstitutional
coercion. '' 3° This question must be resolved by determining the
states' baseline of entitlement: if the states have no pre-existing right
to a benefit offered by Congress, then the benefit offered by Congress
is a gift or gratuity.305 If the states have a pre-existing right to the
benefit, then the condition imposed by Congress amounts to a
sanction. 3° The Court in College Savings seemed to answer this
question by concluding that a threat by Congress to exclude that state
from permissible commercial activity constituted an unlawful
sanction. 30 7 Given this conclusion, any effort by Congress to
condition receipt of federal intellectual property rights, a lawful
commercial activity, on waiver of state sovereign immunity would
likely be construed as a sanction and, thus, give rise to an
unconstitutional condition. To do otherwise would deny the states a
right to obtain federal intellectual property rights that are afforded
private citizens.
IV. ARE THE PURPOSES OF THE IPPRA OF 2003 CONSISTENT WITH
THE PUBLIC POLICY GOALS OF THE FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SYSTEM AND OTHER LEGISLATION?

Congress is empowered under Article I of the Constitution "[t]o

301. Bohannan, supra note 285, at 317 n.228 (noting that whether a patent, for
example, is a gift or gratuity is an "open question").
302. See 145 CONG. REC. S13557 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
303. Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1381.
304. Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract. The Eleventh Amendment and
University-PrivateSector Intellectual Property Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467,
1479 n.41 (2000) (noting, however, that "the outcome is far from certain"); see also
Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1381 (disfavoring this view, but not ruling it out).
305. See Bohannan, supra note 285, at 317-18.
306. See id.
307. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 686-87 (1999).
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One

commentator suggests that the Court's decisions in Florida Prepaid
and College Savings "chill the spirit of Article [I]'s ...protection of
innovations ' 30 9 and render the intellectual property system less
efficient in promoting the sciences and the arts.31 0 To this end, one

commentator suggests that the inducement of new art and literature
under federal copyright laws "is less effective if States can infringe
31 Similarly, the
copyrights without fear of being held liable in court.""
current Register of Copyrights testified that denying copyright
owners the opportunity to sue state infringers dilutes the incentive for
authors, performers, and producers to create, which ultimately
diminishes American culture and the economy.312
In furtherance of this argument, proponents of the IPPRA of
2001 asserted that the conditional waiver provisions of the bill
promote the public purpose of stimulating the creation of intellectual

property by encouraging

states to participate in the federal

intellectual property system.313 As a general rule "enhancing the
scope or enforceability of intellectual property rights increases the
expected reward to those engaged in intellectual work, thereby

308. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. Interpretation of the text of Article I through
colonial usage indicates that the framers meant "the works of authors" when they referred
to "Science" and "the works of inventors" when they referred to the "useful Arts." See
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1-2

(5th ed. 2002).
309. Allison K. Jones, Note, New Property in a New Age of Federalism-TheFight for
IntellectualProperty Protection,35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 513, 513 (2001) (asserting that the
rights inherent in property ownership pervade the democratic ideals of the United States
and that innovators have the right to control the use and dissemination of their creations
and to reap return investments on their "sweat equity").
310. See Malin, supra note 27, at 176 (arguing that the current state of the law
decreases the incentive to invent or compose, resulting in a reduction in intellectual
productivity).
311. Cross, supra note 165, at 359-60.
312. Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 10 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Copyright
Office of the United States Library of Congress) (observing that the fact the legislative
history of the Act did not meet the Court's requirements articulated a decade after
Congress passed the Act is not surprising).
313. Id. at 22-25 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American
Intellectual Property Law Association) (noting that the waiver provisions in the IPPRA of
2001, the predecessor bill to the IPPRA of 2003, were less restrictive than those in the
IPPRA of 1999, which precluded states from acquiring a federal intellectual property right
unless it waived its sovereign immunity from suits arising under those laws). The draft
Leahy/Hatch amendments would restore those restrictive waiver conditions by
conditioning the receipt of intellectual property rights on the waiver of sovereign
immunity. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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'3 14
spurring intellectual creativity and the exploitation of works."
There are, of course, two sides to every coin. One consequence of
legislation restraining state sovereign immunity would be to diminish
the incentive of state employees to create and invent, which punishes
the individual employee and runs against a national intellectual
property system designed to encourage innovation and authorship.3 15
The ultimate question is whether the promotion of the works of
states' authors and useful inventions is best accomplished by
conditioning intellectual property rights on a waiver of immunity or
by allowing states to retain sovereign immunity in intellectual
property infringement suits.316 This question is examined in the
context of whether states, in fact, have an unfair commercial
advantage over private parties under the current federal intellectual
property system and whether the purposes of the IPPRA of 2003 run
counter to the public policy goals of federal research initiatives,
including the Bayh-Dole Act. The effect of the IPPRA of 2003 on
policies underlying international intellectual property treaties also is
examined in this Part.

A.

Do States Have an Unfair CommercialAdvantage over Private
Parties Under the CurrentFederalIntellectual Property System?

When he introduced the IPPRA of 2002, Senator Leahy asserted
that states have an unfair commercial advantage over private parties
under the federal intellectual property system because of the states'
ability to obtain protection under federal patent, copyright and
trademark laws while remaining exempt from liability for infringing
the rights of others. 317 Along these lines, proponents of such
legislation argued that the Supreme Court's rulings in FloridaPrepaid
and College Savings created a gaping hole in intellectual property
enforcement and provided states with the ability to infringe
intellectual property without providing any compensation.3 8 Thus,
these proponents argued that unremedied infringement by state
314. Menell, supra note 189, at 1399. Professor Menell also asserts that "impediments
to the enforcement of the intellectual property rights or limitations on remedies reduce...
[the] opportunity for exploitation, thereby dampening the incentives of those who engage
in creative enterprise." Id.
315. See Malin, supra note 27, at 189.
316. See Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1159 (inquiring whether Congress would
prefer to check some innovation by states to produce a more level playing field).
317. See 148 CONG. REC. S2079 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
318. Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 5-10 (statement of James Rogan,
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent
and Trademark Office).
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entities will likely increase in the environment of reduced checks

against state infringers created by these decisions. 19 Further, these
proponents believed that such legislation will restore the balance of
intellectual property protection and level the playing field by

encouraging states to waive their sovereign immunity-thereby
restoring fairness to intellectual property laws.3 2° Those states which
choose not to waive immunity will have the same limits on enforcing
their intellectual property as private parties would have against the

state, i.e., they will be allowed to obtain injunctive, but not monetary,
relief. To counter this argument, opponents of such legislation
argued that, instead of leveling the playing field, enactment of the
IPPRA would grant owners of federal intellectual property rights

special privileges, i.e., the right to sue states, which no other property
owners can claim.32

l

Furthermore, as universities become more involved in
commercializing their inventions and holding equity in companies
spawned

by faculty

research,3 22 concerns

about

fairness

are

heightened. State sovereign immunity exists, however, even when the
state is acting for profit in a traditionally private enterprise and as a
market participant.3 23 The Court has held that, in the context of
sovereign immunity, evenhandedness between private parties and
states is not to be expected because " '[t]he constitutional role of the
Therefore, an
States sets them apart from other ...defendants.' ,,324
argument based on fairness alone is not likely to succeed.

319. Id.; see also Yvonne A. Tamayo, Patently Absurd: Expanded State Immunity in
the Global Knowledge Market, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2001) (arguing that the increasing
a lucrative activity), available at
value of patents makes infringement
http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issuel/v6ilaOl-Tamayo.html.
320. See AM. ASS'N OF PUBLISHERS, AAP POSITION PAPER (2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); see also AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, AAUP
POSITION PAPER (2002) (asserting that the IPPRA of 2002 would restore a level playing
field in intellectual property law) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). But see
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 685 (1999)
(asserting that evenhandedness between private parties and states is not to be expected).
321. Letter from National Association of College and University Attorneys
("NACUA") to Sens. Daschle and Johnson (Apr. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Letter from
NACUA] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see supra notes 85-95 and
accompanying text (providing the background of the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition
of suits against a state by a private citizen).
322. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
323. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 685. The Court went on to note that the text of the
Eleventh Amendment makes no distinction between commercial and non-commercial
state activities. Id. at 686 n.4.
324. Id. at 685-86 (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 483
U.S. 468, 477 (1987)).
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Do the Purposesof the IPPRA of 2003 Run Counter to the Public
Policy Goals of FederalResearch Initiatives?

Congress recognized that protection of intellectual properties
developed with federal assistance was instrumental to the successful
commercialization of research results when it passed the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980.325 The Bayh-Dole Act provides that "[i]t is the policy
and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development."32' 6 Opponents of the IPPRA of 2002 argued that the
legislation was drafted in a way that threatened to interfere with
longstanding, highly successful federal research and technology
transfer policy initiatives, including the Bayh-Dole Act.327 Under this
line of reasoning, if enacted, such legislation would unnecessarily
interfere with the efforts of state universities to develop technologies
and to transfer them to private sector entrepreneurs for
commercialization.3 28 For this reason, university technology transfer
managers argued that the societal benefit of the Bayh-Dole Act
would be negated by such legislation.3 9 University technology
transfer managers also perceive the effect of such legislation "as
abrogating the Bayh-Dole Act without responding to [the Act's]
dictate that it 'take precedence over any future Act unless that
325. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (2000)).
326. Id. § 200.
The Act also is intended to "promote collaboration between
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities" and "to promote
the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United States."
Id.
327. Letter from NACUA, supra note 321.
328. Id.; see also Hearingon H.R. 2344, supra note 1, at 14 (statement of Leslie Winner,
General Counsel and Vice President, University of North Carolina) (noting that the
IPPRA of 2003 would "severely hamper the ability of public universities to move their
knowledge and research results into the commercial marketplace").
329. See Letter from AUTM to Sens. Patrick Leahy and Orrin Hatch (May 16, 2002)
[hereinafter Letter from AUTMI, http://www.autm.net/announcements/s2031letter.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). In contrast, one commentator argues that the
Bayh-Dole Act does not contribute to the public good. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at
1666-67. Professor Eisenberg asserts that (1) allowing private firms to hold exclusive
rights to inventions produced at public expense requires the public to pay twice for the
same invention; (2) calling for exclusive rights in inventions produced through public
funding "contravenes the conventional wisdom that patent rights on existing inventions
result in a net social loss ex post"; (3) promoting the private appropriation of federallyfunded research calls into question the public goods rationale for public funding of
research; and (4) providing incentives to patent and restricting access to inventions
produced in basic-research institutions threatens to "impoverish the public domain of
research science" that has been an important resource in both the public and private
sectors. Id.
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[future] Act specifically recites [the Bayh-Dole Act] and provides that
[the future Act] shall take precedence over [the Bayh-Dole Act].' "330
Along these lines, opponents of the legislation also argued that "the
terms and provisions of [the IPPRA of 2002] are internally
'
inconsistent."3 31
This apparent inconsistency arises because the Act
prevents state entities from securing federal intellectual property

protection absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, but purports to
"promote technological innovation and artistic creation in
furtherance of the policies underlying Federal
laws and international
3 32
property.
intellectual
to
treaties relating
In addition to conflicting with the public policy goals of the
Bayh-Dole Act, the IPPRA of 2003 conflicts with the goals of other
federal funding initiatives under the National Science Foundation and

the Advanced Technology Program.333 These funding programs often
require the recipient to pursue intellectual property rights for
inventions developed under its grants. If a public university cannot
enforce federal intellectual property rights, there is no incentive to
pursue such rights. To do so would be a mere formality. That is, a
university could go through the often expensive and time-consuming
process of obtaining intellectual property rights to comply with the

funding program, but it could not enforce these rights. As a result,
opponents of the IPPRA of 2002 and related legislation argued that
technology transfer efforts at public universities would be severely
undermined, if not entirely crippled.334
Furthermore, a number of public universities have expressed
concerns about the legislation's possible impact on collaborative
research programs and universities' ability to recruit and retain high330. See Letter from AUTM, supra note 329, at 2 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 210 (2000)).
331. Id.
332. See id. (quoting the IPPRA of 2002).
333. See Bone, supra note 304, at 1468 (noting that federal policy places a high priority
on the transfer of government-funded research technology to the private sector).
334. Letter from NACUA, supra note 319. These opponents of the IPPRA of 2002
argue (1) that private companies would no longer have any incentive to enter into
cooperative agreements with public universities; (2) if a state licenses or sells rights to a
particular piece of intellectual property to a private party, that party would be barred from
seeking damages for infringement of its license or assignment-that is, the private party
that commercializes the state-created product will not be able to obtain damages if
another private party infringes; and (3) because of this consequence, such legislation
undercuts the marketability of public-university-created intellectual properties and runs
directly counter to federal efforts to encourage technology transfer. Id. Such legislation
would eradicate much of the cooperation that has developed between state universities
and the private sector since passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. See Hearing on H.R. 2344,
supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Leslie Winner, General Counsel and Vice President,
University of North Carolina).
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quality faculty.335 Interestingly, not all academics oppose such
legislation. The American Federation of Teachers, for example,
adopted the view that the IPPRA of 2002 would restore intellectual
property rights of public employees and allow a state employee to sue
a state agency, including a public university, when the state agency
infringes the employee's intellectual property rights.336
Also, state governors argue that the IPPRA of 2003 would have a
detrimental effect on research at public universities and on the
development of new economies based on those research efforts,
thereby stunting economic development and growth.337
These
governors argue that forcing a state to choose between waiving its
sovereign immunity or forgoing protection of intellectual property
rights would limit the ability of public research universities to assist
states in building new economies.33
For example, the strong
technology-driven economy of the Research Triangle Park of North
Carolina could suffer under a system that allows private citizens to
initiate suits for infringement against public research universities.3 39
In contrast, some argue that the current state of the law
discourages commercially beneficial relationships between innovators
and state institutions, especially public universities, 340 and that the
inability to enforce intellectual property laws against the states could

335. See Letter from NACUA, supra note 319; see also Malin, supra note 27, at 189
(noting that legislative acts designed to restrain state sovereign immunity would make it
more difficult for nonconsenting states "to attract top scientists to work at their
universities because of the inability to obtain intellectual-property protection for their
work").
336. See American Federation of Teachers, AFT: Higher Education: Bill Would
Protect Intellectual Property Rights, at http://www.aft.org/higher.ed/IPRights.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
337. Letter from Govs. John Engler and Paul E. Patton to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (May
15, 2002) [Engler/Patton Letter],
http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,
C_LETTER%5ED_3746,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
338. Id.
339. Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 1, at 43 (statement of Leslie Winner, General
Counsel and Vice President, University of North Carolina). The Research Triangle Park
is a joint public/private research park that was created in 1959 from cooperative efforts by
business, academic, and industry backers in North Carolina. See generally Research
Triangle Park, at http://www.rtp.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page&filename=about us_
history.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (providing historical and current information on
Research Triangle Park) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The Park is
located between Duke University, North Carolina State University, and the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Id. It currently houses more than one hundred research
and development facilities including biotechnology, pharmaceutical, telecommunication,
and microelectronic firms. Id. Capital investment in the Park exceeds $2 billion. Id.
340. See Jones, supra note 309, at 518.
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" '
have a negative impact on university-industry research cooperation.34
Critics of unchecked state sovereign immunity theorize that state
infringement will increase under the current state of the law. This
increase in infringement, in turn, could chill the incentives of private
firms to enter into cooperative research ventures with public
universities and could encourage firms to deal with private
universities, which do not have sovereign immunity.3 42
These fears, however, presuppose that public universities will
engage in widespread infringement, even though there is little
empirical evidence to support this prediction. These fears also fail to
account for the importance of cooperative relationships between
public universities and private firms.343 For example, because public
universities can expect to deal with private firms on an ongoing or
repeat basis, informal mechanisms, such as reputation, can act as a
substitute for legal sanctions to deter infringement.' 4 Also, private
firms may develop alternate business strategies to account for a high
risk of infringement.3 45 For example, many private firms now enter
into long-term contractual relationships in the form of industryuniversity research consortia and funding agreements. 346 These
market influences, social norms, and institutional constraints will
likely dissuade states from engaging in widespread infringement of
federal intellectual property rights, even in the absence of legislative
intervention.34 7
Scientific research in public universities is one area, however, in
which these social and institutional constraints might not be as
effective in deterring infringing activity.3 48 Groundbreaking results in
rapidly developing fields, such as biotechnology, have drawn public

341. See Bone, supra note 304, at 1469.
342. See id. at 1498 (noting that a private firm collaborating with a public university
faces the risk that the university will misappropriate the firm's intellectual property or use
it beyond the terms of the cooperative agreement under the protective umbrella of state
immunity).
343. See id. at 1498-99.
344. See id. at 1499.
345. See id. (noting that such responses might generate costs of their own even if they
keep infringement in check); Menell, supra note 189, at 1436-38 (discussing market

responses to the risks of state infringement of intellectual property rights).
346. See Menell, supra note 189, at 1436-37 (noting that in these formal, contractual

relationships, the private firm can protect against infringement through explicit provisions
in the agreement that are enforceable in state court). Furthermore, the financial
incentives contained in these agreements provide the private firm with leverage for
insisting on protection from infringing activities. Id. at 1437.
347. See id. at 1432.
348. See id. at 1433.
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universities into the commercial sphere.3 49
This competitive
environment increases the potential for infringing activity."' In
addition, decreases in government funding, at both the state and
federal level, have led public universities to explore licensing of
intellectual property as a means of funding research.35 ' Furthermore,
university faculty and researchers have increasingly sought to
commercialize their research results, adding to the proliferation of
start-up companies in which universities are stakeholders.3 52
Although the professional and academic norms of integrity and
reputation traditionally have minimized the risk that public university
researchers would infringe the intellectual property rights of others,
recent and potentially lucrative ventures into commercial markets
raise the risk of infringing activity.353 Furthermore, the influx of
industry funds into public university research programs raises the
question of whether such research is truly "public" in nature and
deserving of protection under the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity.354
Even critics of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence acknowledge, however, that Congress's response to
state infringement of privately-owned intellectual property rights
"should be sensitive to the special role state universities play in the
'
development of useful new technologies."3 55
To this end, any
approach proposed by Congress should take into account its effect on
innovation and creativity at public universities and on the transfer of
that technology into the private sector. Congress, therefore, should

349. See generally Dueker, supra note 6 (discussing the

commercialization

of

university-developed biomedical technologies).
350. See Menell, supra note 189, at 1433.
351. See id. at 1434; see also AUTM, FY 2000, supra note 8 (describing licensing of

university research).
352. See Menell, supra note 189, at 1434.

See generally Harrington, supra note 11

(describing the proliferation of start-up companies based on university research).
353. See Menell, supra note 189, at 1435; see also Rai, supra note 7, at 88 (noting that
prior to the 1980s traditional academic norms discouraged property rights in scientific
discoveries, and the law reinforced the reluctance of academic scientists and institutions to

secure property rights).
354. See Menel, supra note 189, at 1435-36; see also Newberg & Dunn, supra note 13,

at 197 (discussing the tension between the role of universities as public institutions of
education and research, and the role of universities as "business partners of private
firms"); Rai, supra note 7, at 90 (noting that a "central element of the scientific ethos" is
that scientific knowledge is a shared resource and that such information should be shared
in the public domain).
355. Polse, supra note 21, at 510 (arguing that Congress should close the loophole in
the federal intellectual property system created by Florida Prepaid with an approach

designed to minimize potentially harmful effects on state university research programs).
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take steps to minimize the impact on university technology transfer

while protecting private intellectual property owners from egregious
state infringing actions." 6
C.

Is the IPPRA of 2003 Consistent with Policies Underlying
InternationalTreaties Relating to Intellectual Property?

Proponents of the IPPRA of 2001 asserted that the Florida
Prepaid and College Savings decisions compromise the ability of the

United States to advocate effective enforcement of intellectual
property rights in other countries and to fulfill its own obligations
under international treaties.3 57
Under this view, this apparent

inconsistency in the enforcement of intellectual property laws
damages the United States' credibility internationally and is likely to
harm American businesses.3" 8
Specifically, proponents of the
legislation raised concerns regarding the potential vulnerability of the
United States under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs").359
Provisions of TRIPs
obligate member nations to have the authority to order a party to
desist from infringement and "to order the infringer to pay the right

holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right
36
holder has suffered because of an infringement.""

Although TRIPs

contains provisions for exempting federal governments from liability,
it contains no such provisions for states.361 Questions have already
arisen regarding the ability of the United States to comply with
356. See infra Part V.E (proposing an approach to alternative legislation to achieve the
goal of deterring infringement of states' intellectual property rights that primarily follows
the analytical framework set forth in Florida Prepaidand Chavez).
357. Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 6, 8 (statement of James E. Rogan,
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent
and Trademark Office) (noting that one-half of U.S. exports depend on some type of
intellectual property protection and arguing that to advocate strong enforcement abroad,
the United States must provide a strong means of enforcement in this country).
358. Id.
359. Id. at 22 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual
Property Law Association).
360. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125,

1215 (1994) (discussing provisions of TRIPs), http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27
-trips.doc (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
361. Hearing on S. 1611, supra note 14, at 27 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive
Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association) (noting that because Congress
enacted the intellectual property remedy acts "before the end of 1992, there was no
reason.., to seek exceptions for the States" when negotiations for TRIPs concluded in
1993).
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provisions of TRIPs in light of the Florida Prepaiddecisions.362 For
example, "a bar to such remedies where the infringer is a state
government may place the United States in violation of the TRIPs
provisions. "363
Although this issue does not directly invoke the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity, and a thorough discussion of
the impact of state sovereign immunity on foreign trade agreements is
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is an issue that must be
considered by Congress when addressing remedies for infringement
of intellectual property rights by states.3 6
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO LEGISLATION TO PROTECT
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM STATE INFRINGEMENT

Because of the uncertainties regarding the constitutionality of
legislative initiatives drafted to address remedies for state
infringement of federal intellectual property rights, commentators
have suggested several alternative approaches in this area of law.
These approaches are summarized in this Part, along with an
alternative approach drawn from the decisions in FloridaPrepaidand
Chavez. This alternative approach would (1) limit causes of action by
a private party against a state to acts of intentional infringement;
(2) limit suits to those against states that exhibit a pattern of
infringement; and (3) allow suits against only those states with
inadequate state remedies.
A.

Voluntary Waiver of Immunity

Allowing each state entity to voluntarily waive its sovereign
immunity to protect its individual federal intellectual property rights
would forego the dangers associated with the conditional waiver
provisions of the IPPRA of 2003. Generally, a state may waive its
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.365 States, however,

362. HearingBefore House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, supra note
2, at 10-11 (statement of Todd Dickenson, Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office) (noting that the
World Trade Organization's TRIPs Counsel has formerly asked the United States to
clarify (1) what constitutes compliance with Article 44(2) of TRIPs, and (2) whether
actions can be brought against states for intellectual property violations in federal court).
363. Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1044 (concluding that the "present immunity
doctrines may allow Congress to create alternate remedies sufficient to satisfy

international agreements").
364. See id. at 1173-95 (providing a thorough discussion of the implications of state
sovereign immunity and infringement of intellectual property rights on foreign treaties);
Menell, supra note 189, at 1448-64 (same).
365. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (describing sovereign immunity as
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may be prohibited from waiving their immunity by their own laws3 66
and are likely to be reluctant to do so voluntarily.367 In any event, the
IPPRA of 2003 would allow public universities to be protected under
federal intellectual property laws only if their state governments
agree to waive state sovereign immunity as a whole.368 Under this
reasoning, even if a public university decided to waive immunity to
protect its intellectual property under federal law, it could not do so
unless the state legislature waived immunity for all state entities.36 9
The decision to waive immunity rests with a state's legislature and not
with an individual public university.37 ° Thus, an approach based on
allowing each state entity to waive its immunity independently, as
opposed to a blanket waiver by the state, would not be tenable.
B.

Suit by the FederalGovernment on Behalf of the Private
IntellectualProperty Owner

Because the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit by the
United States against a state, Congress could amend the federal
intellectual property laws to allow the federal government to sue the
allegedly infringing state on behalf of the private intellectual property
owner.37 1 Professor Cross argues that this approach is viable in the
context of copyright law because the federal government has an
interest in an effective system of copyright; the burden, in terms of an
increased case load, on the federal government would not be that
great; and the Copyright Act contains criminal provisions that are
prosecuted by the United States Attorney.3 72
Professor Cross
acknowledges that the federal government, to date, has not shown an
interest in intervening in copyright infringement cases.37 3 Suits by the
"a personal privilege which [the state] may waive at its pleasure").
366. Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 1, at 14 (statement of Leslie Winner, General
Counsel and Vice President, University of North Carolina) (noting that most states only
allow the legislature to waive immunity, whereas some states require a constitutional
amendment).
367. Engler/Patton Letter, supra note 337 (noting the belief that states would likely be
reluctant to allow even a limited waiver of sovereign immunity).
368. Letter from C. Peter Magrath, President, National Association of State
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (Apr. 17, 2002),
http://www.nasulgc.orgfWashington-Watch/Letters2002/s2031state-sovereign-immunity.
pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
369. Id.
370. Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 1, at 14 (statement of Leslie Winner, General
Counsel and Vice President, University of North Carolina).
371. Cross, supra note 165, at 360-61.
372. Id. at 361.
373. Id.
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federal government, however, have "practical and political, [if] not
doctrinal," problems.374 For example, favoring a certain state or a
scarcity of resources could render this approach ineffective.375 As a
result, it is "unlikely that the United States government [would] be
willing or able to intervene on behalf of private intellectual property
3 76
plaintiffs with claims against state governments.
Professor Meltzer has suggested similar approaches involving
federal government suits against states.377 For example, Congress
could "authorize the Attorney General to bring suit [in federal court]
in the name of the United States against state governments [allegedly]
engaging" in infringing conduct.378 One remedy under this approach
would be to assess a penalty against the state government in the
amount of the injury to the intellectual property owner.3 79 An
alternative remedy under this approach would be for the federal
government to collect a fine and disburse it to the injured party.380
Congress also could authorize private parties to sue state
governments in the name of the United States, provided the parties
procure the injured party's consent.38 ' Such a proposal, however,
might be construed as too similar to the kind of circumvention of
Seminole Tribe that the Court has consistently prohibited.382
C.

Suit in State Court

Nothing in the language of the Eleventh Amendment prevents a
state court from having jurisdiction over suits against a state. Thus, as
a last resort, some commentators suggest that "Congress [could] rely
upon state courts to require state governments to provide
'
retrospective relief authorized by federal law."383
Under this
approach, federal courts and state courts would have concurrent
374. Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1115-21.
375. Id. at 1117.
376. Id.
377. See Meltzer, supra note 103, at 55-57.
378. See id. at 55.
379. Id. (noting that "such a provision would promote compliance" with federal
intellectual property laws, but would "afford no compensation to the intellectual property
holder").
380. Jonathon R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539, 553 (1995).

381. Id. at 556-57 (observing that such an action, which is similar to a qui tam action,
would result in a suit against a state in federal court for retrospective relief with damages

ultimately paid to the injured, private party).
382. See Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1118-19 (discussing potential objections to qui
tam actions in the context of the enforcement of intellectual property rights).
383. See Meltzer, supra note 103, at 57-61.
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jurisdiction over suits brought under federal patent, copyright, and
trademark laws. An advantage of this approach is that Congress
could use its Article I powers to impose liability on the states in state
courts.3 Professor Cross notes, however, that this proposed use of
state courts has limits. 38 5 Congress's ability to use state courts as a
forum to adjudicate claims arising under federal law was significantly
limited in Alden v. Maine.3 s6 Under Alden, a state's amenability to a
suit in its own courts "depends both on Congress's willingness to
grant jurisdiction to the state courts and on whether the State allows
itself to be sued on analogous claims. 3 87 Thus, if a state asserts
immunity and does not consent to suit in its own courts, those courts
also will be unavailable for adjudicating intellectual property suits
against the state.38 8
D. Condition Receipt of FederalResearch Funding on Waiver of
State Sovereign Immunity
One approach suggested in the wake of Congress's initial
attempt in the IPPRA of 1999 to address the Court's decisions in
Florida Prepaid and College Savings advocates the use of the
spending power to hold public universities accountable for violations
of intellectual property law.3 89 Under this approach, the state would
waive its sovereign immunity from suit pursuant to the intellectual
property laws that govern the subject research activities.3 90 In
exchange for this waiver, the state could subsequently receive federal
research funding from Congress. 39' The constitutional support for this
approach lies in the Spending Clause of Article I, which, in relevant
part, grants Congress the power to provide for "the general Welfare
of the United States. '392 The doctrinal support for this approach is
derived from Supreme Court decisions holding that "Congress may
384. See Cross, supra note 165, at 365 (noting that the approach would permit Congress
to avoid compliance with City of Boerne's proportionality requirement).
385. Id. at 364.
386. See id. at 364-65.
387. Id. at 365-66.
388. Id. at 366 (noting that Congress cannot "force States to open their courts for
adjudicating liability claims").
389. See Malin, supra note 27, at 190-91 (offering specific instances where federal
money might be withheld); Meltzer, supra note 103, at 50-55 (advocating the use of the
conditional spending power to impose state liability under federal programs, but
acknowledging that this approach is not a "cure-all" to the Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe); Poise, supra note 21, at 530 (advocating the conditional spending approach).
390. Poise, supra note 21, at 530.
391. Id.
392. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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achieve objectives through the use of the spending power that it
'
cannot achieve through direct regulation."3 93
This approach would
purportedly ensure that intellectual property created from federallyfunded research would remain patentable, thus satisfying the
objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act.394
This approach suffers from two fatal flaws, however. First, as a
matter of public policy, this approach would defeat, rather than fulfill,
the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act. The Bayh-Dole Act seeks to
promote securing patent protection for inventions arising from
federally-funded research.395 By attaching such conditions on the
receipt of federal funding, this approach would, in effect, return the
state of technology transfer to pre-Bayh-Dole levels. States would
likely forego such conditional research funding and opt for funding
that does not require them to waive immunity from suit in federal
court. Such funding likely would not require states to pursue
intellectual property rights on the research results, although states
could choose to do so if they desired.
Second, although this approach would likely pass constitutional
muster under Congress's conditional spending powers as articulated
in South Dakota v. Dole,396 it still relies on the application of an
Article I power, the Spending Clause, to condition a waiver of state
sovereign immunity. Thus, the holding in Seminole Tribe would
apparently proscribe such legislation.3 97 An advocate of this approach
notes, however, that Seminole Tribe and College Savings applied to
direct attempts by Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity.3 98
The spending power approach, in contrast, would constitute an
indirect attempt to encourage states to waive immunity.3 99
Finally, the constitutionality of such a provision depends on
whether the price of not complying with the condition, i.e., the loss of
federal funding, is so burdensome as to rise to the level of undue
coercion.4"0 If this proposal were to pass the coercion obstacle, the

393. Polse, supra note 21, at 530 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)
and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) for support of this proposition).
394. Id.
395. See supra note 3.
396. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
397. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress
cannot use its Article I powers to directly force the states to waive sovereign immunity).
398. Polse, supra note 21, at 535.
399. See id.
400. See Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1376-77 (noting that "[t]he Court has yet to strike
down a program of conditional spending" on those grounds, so "the coercion limitation
does not pose an obstacle" to this approach).
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scope of such a waiver must satisfy the germaneness requirement
under Dole.4"' This requirement could limit which state entities
would be affected by such a waiver-that is, would only the program

receiving federal funding be subjected to this waiver or would the
waiver apply to the entire agency in which the particular program is
located?4 02 Given the uncertainties associated with this approach, an

alternative approach is proposed in the next Section.
E. Alternative Approach Modeled After Florida Prepaid and Chavez
The IPPRA of 2003 and the draft Leahy/Hatch amendments are
overly broad and most likely would not withstand Supreme Court
scrutiny. The following approach to alternative legislation would
achieve the goal of deterring infringement of privately-owned

intellectual property by the states, while complying with current
Eleventh Amendment doctrine. This approach primarily follows the
analytical framework set forth in FloridaPrepaidand Chavez.4 3
First, the legislation should limit causes of action by a private

party against a state to intentional infringement or infringement
explicitly authorized by state policy. The Court in Florida Prepaid
found that holding states liable for negligent infringement would be a
disproportionate penalty because only willful misconduct constitutes
a Fourteenth Amendment violation.4 " Thus, under that reasoning, a
state's negligent infringement of privately-owned intellectual
property rights would not give rise to a constitutional violation that
Congress could remedy by enacting legislation under its Section 5
powers.4 °5
One drawback to this proposal is that infringement under federal
intellectual property laws is a strict liability offense. 4 6 Knowledge
401. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
402. See Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1378 (arguing that "Congress may condition funds
on a waiver by the entire state agency receiving the funding").
403. See Cross, supra note 165, at 355 (observing that Chavez "could well serve as a
blueprint for other courts").
404. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 643-45 (1999). This approach is consistent with the Court's previous holding that no
constitutional violation occurs where a deprivation of life, liberty, or property is merely
negligent. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (holding it is not a Fourteenth
Amendment deprivation for a prison custodian to leave a pillow on prison stairs).
405. See Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 643-45 (noting that "a state actor's negligent act
that causes unintended injury to a person's property does not 'deprive' that person of
property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause").
406. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (defining infringement under the Patent Act in
general terms that would include negligent, and even inadvertent, behavior); 2 PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 9.4, at 9:16 (2d ed. Supp. 2004) (noting that one who infringes
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and intent are generally considered only with respect to damages.

4 °7

In practice, most intellectual property infringement suits allege willful
infringement,4

8

even though infringement of patents, copyrights, and

trademarks are often not intentional.
"intentional"

or "negligent"

are

9

Furthermore, the terms

not defined

with regard

to

intellectual property law. 410 Therefore, the difficulty in ascertaining
the necessary mens rea required for "intentional" state infringement
might defeat the applicability and effectiveness of this type of
provision. Nevertheless, it should act as a deterrent to intentional
state infringement of federal intellectual property rights and should

quell the fears of private intellectual property owners of rampant
state infringement in view of the FloridaPrepaidand College Savings

decisions.
Second, the legislation should limit suits to those against states
that exhibit a pattern or high incidence of infringement.41 1 Consistent

with the previous section, "a significant proportion of infringements
[must be] non-negligent, thus rising to the level of a possible
constitutional violation.

' 412

The difficulty in enforcing this type of

provision lies in building a record of evidence of state infringement.413
a copyright unintentionally is nevertheless liable); 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:107, at 23-268 (4th ed. 2000) (noting
that intent is not required for infringement of a federally registered trademark).
407. FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 645.
408. See id. at 654 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the problem of suing a state
for negligent infringement is unlikely to occur).
409. See Bone, supra note 304, at 1472-73 (noting that, although some cases of state
infringement might be intentional, incidental infringement poses "a more serious risk").
States generally do not willfully seek to infringe intellectual property rights, and the Court
has been unwilling to assume that the states will refuse to abide by federal laws. See
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (noting that "[t]he good faith of the States ... provides
an important assurance that 'this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land' " (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI)). But see Tamayo, supra
note 319, at 5 (arguing that "[j]udicial expectations that the state 'sovereign' will govern
itself and refrain from infringing the rights of patent holders seem remarkably naive").
410. Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1064 (noting that the Court in Daniels derived
"concepts of negligence ... from ordinary tort law"); Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1353
(noting that the lack of a clear definition of "intentional" might limit the efficacy of such a
provision).
411. Cf. Wilmoth, supra note 28, at 537-41 (arguing that the Court in Florida Prepaid
relied too heavily upon the legislative record at the expense of a more detailed analysis of
the congruence and proportionality standard set forth in City of Boerne).
412. See Berman et al., supra note 27, at 1076.
413. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377-83 (2001) (requiring that legislation
allowing for private suits against a state must be based on an adequate legislative record,
but leaving open the question of what would satisfy this requirement); see also Berman et
al., supra note 27, at 1077 ("[Any attempt to build a better record confronts not only a
question of raw numbers-how often do states infringe?-but also a question of
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A pattern of infringement could be shown, for example, by evidence
that a state has been subjected to repeated injunctive relief under the
doctrine of Ex parte Young. Building such a record, however, could
be accomplished only over a period of time. As a result, remedies
might not be immediately available to aggrieved parties under this
proposal. Nevertheless, this proposal would lay the groundwork for
identifying egregious state infringers that consistently ignore federal
intellectual property laws.
Third, suits should be allowed only against states with inadequate
remedies under state law.414 In FloridaPrepaid,the Court noted that
Congress did not limit the coverage of the Patent Remedy Act to
cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a
state refuses to provide any remedies in state court for patent owners
whose patents it had infringed or to make an attempt to confine the
reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of intentional
infringement. 415 Thus, under this reading of FloridaPrepaid,a state
must provide adequate remedies.
Professor Meltzer notes, however, that it may be difficult to
ascertain the adequacy of state remedies in a regime of federal
intellectual property law that, for the most part, preempts state
protection of intellectual property rights and precludes "state court
416
jurisdiction for suits arising under the patent and copyright laws.
He predicts, however, that the enactment of such a statute by
Congress might encourage states to create adequate remedies to
move themselves beyond the reach of the federal statute. 417 The
difficulty then would lie in what kind of remedy would be considered
"adequate. 41 8 Furthermore, it is debatable how far state remedies, to
be decided in state courts, should expand into the domain of federal
419
intellectual property law.
proportion-how much of that infringement is actually unconstitutional?").
414. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying the third
prong of the FloridaPrepaidanalytical framework in view of City of Boerne).
415. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,

646 (1999).
416. Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1354-55. For an overview of existing remedies,
including remedies in state court, against state infringement after Florida Prepaid and
College Savings, see Malin, supra note 27, at 164-75.
417. Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1355.
418. See id.
419. Id. at 1356-57.
Generally, states may not offer patent-like protection to
intellectual creations that are not protected under federal law. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc.

v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153-57 (1989) (concluding that state law should
not be allowed to offer patent protection that federal law denies); Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964) (holding that state laws should not offer
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Legislation based on this approach would be narrower in scope
than those legislative initiatives already introduced in Congress. The
details of any such legislation would, of course, need to be more
clearly defined. Because this approach is based on the analytical
framework of Florida Prepaid,however, it should survive Supreme
Court scrutiny.
How effective it would be in deterring state
infringement of federal intellectual property rights is debatable, but it
should act as a deterrent to intentional and repeated infringing acts.
This approach ultimately would provide a remedy for private
intellectual property owners against egregious state actors and dispel
fears that state entities will engage in rampant infringing activities.
CONCLUSION

Balancing the rights of private intellectual property owners
against state infringers is a difficult task in view of the Court's current
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Regardless of whether one
believes this jurisprudence is sound, any legislation designed to
abrogate state sovereign immunity or condition immunity on some
type of waiver ultimately must comply with the Supreme Court's
Eleventh Amendment doctrine and be consistent with the public
policy goals of the Bayh-Dole Act and other federally-funded
research initiatives. Recent attempts by Congress to address federal
intellectual property rights and state sovereign immunity likely will
fail in this regard. Congress should draft narrower provisions that
comply with the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and
protect the rights of private intellectual property owners. A simple
approach following the analytical framework laid out in Florida
Prepaid and Chavez provides the groundwork for viable legislation.
This approach would achieve the goal of checking state infringement
of federal intellectual property rights while allowing non-infringing
state entities to retain their sovereign immunity.
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